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I. Introduction 
Having a fall birthday, especially one that falls around—
and sometimes on—Thanksgiving, can be troubling. In previous 
years, I was often required to split time with close family and 
friends who wanted to wish me a happy holiday season as well 
as a happy birthday (all while inappropriately celebrating the 
mass genocide of American Indians). On one such celebratory 
occasion, I attended a dinner party hosted by a good friend. I 
attended the dinner party with my closest fraternity brother. 
He was accompanied by his fiancé. Always ones with 
competitive spirits, my fraternity brother and I challenged his 
fiancé and my good friend’s sister to a “friendly” game of 
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Spades.1 We played a quick game, one to 350 points. At the 
end of the game, the score was “tied.” More correctly, my 
fraternity brother and I had a score of 358 points. The ladies 
had a score of 352 points. Under customary rules, my fraternity 
brother and I would be declared the victors, for it is tradition—
in Spades—to declare the team with the most points when 
either team or both teams surpass 350 points the winner of 
the game.  
That day would be different, though. My good friend’s 
sister, who lived with my good friend, declared that the rules 
of her house dictated a sudden death overtime hand of Spades. 
My fraternity brother and I would play the requested hand 
although we were both chagrined and bewildered at this 
sudden rule change/announcement. We went on to win that 
hand, too. We earned seven books; they earned six books. My 
friend’s sister would preempt any further celebration and/or 
exuberance by declaring that house rules required that the 
victors win by a decisive number of books when the game is in 
overtime. To this day, I am unsure as to how a score of 7–6 was 
not decisive because seven is certainly and decidedly more than 
six. We would ultimately play several hands before my 
fraternity brother and I would lose a hand outright (8–5). The 
game would end immediately. When my fraternity brother and 
I protested, my friend’s sister asserted that she was simply 
applying the house rules! 
In a dispute over a card game, house rules dramatically 
shifted the outcome(s) of the game. More importantly, the shift 
in house rules provided an insurmountable barrier to achieving 
my team’s goal: winning the game. As I prepared for my first 
class (one about politics and power in education) as a tenure-
track faculty member, I re-read race-related education federal 
court cases. In many ways, it appears that the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts have endorsed the use of “house 
rules” in race-related education cases, except the stakes are 
much higher when considering the gatekeeper that a college 
diploma may serve in opening or shutting doors to future 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally WANDA GARNER, HOW TO PLAY SPADES (2012) (stating that 
spades is a card game played with four players, though it can be played with 
only two and the objective is to score 500 points before the opponents). 
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educational, occupational, and social mobility. This paper 
discusses the existence of house rules and the circumstances 
necessary to perpetuate that power in both primary and 
secondary education and higher education, acknowledging the 
similarities between the use of house rules in both arenas. 
II. The Half-Hearted Attempt to Desegregate Schools: The 
Creation of a White Power to Dictate the Pace of Forgiveness via 
Brown and its Progeny 
The power of the pen may not always be mightier than 
the power of the sword, but such is currently the case when 
considering how the story of desegregating the nation’s public 
schools is told. While many scholars debate the merits of 
integrated public schools as opposed to segregated public schools 
based on the nation’s failed attempt to desegregate its public 
schools, little attention is paid to the fact that the nation never 
wholeheartedly attempted to desegregate its schools. It is 
necessary, then, to recast the facts of K-12 school desegregation 
efforts as taken up by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The Supreme Court misplaced the power to dictate the pace of 
desegregation and followed that misplacement with the 
provision of an opt-out clause for those parents seeking shelter 
from the requirement to desegregate the nation’s public schools. 
Though often trumpeted as a victory, the Court’s decisions in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka2 and much of its 
progeny were empty promises that have not been fully 
realized by later generations of minority students at the 
secondary and primary levels of education. The Court’s 
endorsement of a right for White Americans to be comfortable 
with the speed and procedure of desegregation later developed 
into the power to set house rules regarding the use of race in 
education. As realized in the story provided in the introduction, 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
[hereinafter Brown I] (finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal,” and holding “plaintiffs and others similarly situated for 
whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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one is in the proverbial catbird’s seat when he or she has the 
power to set and adjust the house rules. The person who sets 
the house rules always has the option of winning the game 
since the house rules for winning may well change at their 
discretion until the setter of house rules has won the game. 
A. The Illusion of “Forced Integration:” The Court’s Approval of 
Integration on the Terms of Whites 
Since Plessy v. Ferguson, and even before that case, it was 
legal to deny Black Americans entrance into public 
accommodations that were thought to be reserved for White 
Americans so long as there was a “separate but equal” facility 
reserved for Black Americans.3 The Supreme Court of the 
United States invalidated segregative statutes and explicitly 
overruled the holding in Plessy4 that allowed for the separate 
but equal education of Black students in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka.5 Despite the fact that the Black schools 
had been or were being equalized in many cases, the Court 
struck down the statutes and policies requiring the 
segregation of public primary and secondary schools on the 
grounds that segregated schools could not be made equal.6 The 
Court’s opinion in Brown I appeared and is sometimes 
remembered to have been a forceful repudiation of the ugly 
truths of racism and segregation, but such memories of the 
watershed case ruled on in 1954 are nostalgic at best. Perhaps 
these memories are even delusional. A passive reading of the 
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II, 
the remedies portions of Brown, reveals that the desegregation of 
the nation’s public schools was not to be done immediately but 
rather with “all deliberate speed.”7  
                                                                                                     
 3. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (establishing the infamous phrase “separate but equal,” and 
upholding the Louisiana statute requiring railway companies to maintain such 
accommodations as valid). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 6. Id. at 487–93. 
 7. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) 
[hereinafter Brown II] (requiring that the defendants “make a prompt and 
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What exactly did the Court mean by the phrase “all 
deliberate speed”?8 Tradition would create the perception that 
attempts at desegregation in the primary and secondary school 
settings of the United States occurred by force or judicial fiat; 
neither case occurred in actuality. Far from the requirement of 
desegregating all of the nation’s schools at once and at all costs, 
the Court in Brown II ordered that schools be desegregated in 
a method guided by equity.9 Unfortunately, the idea of equity 
was addressed from the perspective of White Americans who 
had previously adopted systems intended to segregate the 
nation’s public schools.10 The most appalling focus of the 
Court’s decision in Brown II is the High Court’s instruction that 
equitable principles take into account “the public interest in the 
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective 
manner.”11 In other words, desegregation would move at the 
pace that White Americans found comfortable. The Court’s 
reasoning in the most exalted race-related education case 
violated a core principle of forgiveness and restoration: those who 
were wronged could only be made whole to the extent and at 
the pace that those who wronged the victims found 
appropriate. This reasoning flies in the face of concepts of 
forgiveness. Thus, the myth that an activist court violated the 
ability of White parents to choose the educational setting for 
their children is a non-truth, if not an outright lie. 
What pace did the public interest dictate? The pace of 
desegregating the nation’s public schools was, in fact, 
                                                                                                     
reasonable start to full compliance with [the Court’s] May 17, 1954 ruling.”). 
 8. See id. (“[T]he cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such 
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as 
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”).  
 9. See id. (“[T]he courts will be guided by equitable principles. 
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping 
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private 
needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity 
power.”). 
 10. See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 
62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (analyzing Supreme Court cases in a discussion 
questioning how Black Americans have become marginalized despite the 
illegality of racial discrimination). 
 11. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–300. 
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deliberate. It was deliberately slow to be exact. Over a decade 
after the Court’s decisions in Brown I and Brown II, little had 
changed in terms of the racial composition of the nation’s public 
schools.12 School districts devised plans that were intended to 
give a mirage of school desegregation, but in effect did very 
little to desegregate schools. In fact, some—if not most—of the 
plans maintained the segregated school systems that existed 
before Brown I and Brown II. So little had changed to address 
the segregation of the nation’s public schools across many 
locales in the nation that the Supreme Court decided to 
deliver measurable criteria for determining whether districts 
had effectively desegregated its schools. The thrust of cases 
like Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County 
and Green v. County School Board of New Kent County was that 
recalcitrant school districts could purportedly no longer overtly 
or covertly avoid the desegregation of their publicly-funded 
schools.13 
White Americans had been given great leniency in 
remedying the immediate and lasting effects of segregated 
schools after their efforts to segregate and mistreat Black 
students. Presumably, the Court imagined that White 
Americans, who had supported the segregation of the nation’s 
public schools, would openly accept the idea of desegregated 
schools. Having offered that the desegregation of the nation’s 
public schools must occur but at a pace that is acceptable to 
White Americans, the Supreme Court had given preference to 
the psyches of White Americans over the equitable interests of 
Black Americans. The school desegregation cases were no longer 
about the wrong that White Americans had done to Black 
Americans, the school desegregation cases were now about 
how White Americans could most easily accept the new 
                                                                                                     
 12. Compare Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 
233–34 (1964) (commenting that school closures did not comply with the “all 
deliberate speed” requirement, and these children were being denied their 
constitutional right to “an education equal to that afforded by the public schools 
in the other parts of Virginia”), and Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 
Va., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (finding that the school board’s plan had 
impermissibly created a dual system). 
 13. See Brown II, supra note 7, at 298 (providing cases showing examples of 
school districts employing plans that failed to comport with the “all deliberate 
speed” requirement). 
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realities of desegregated schools. Against this backdrop, the 
Court would sanction what started as an attempt of 
recalcitrant White populations to wait out the national will to 
desegregate (which was successful) and what later transformed 
into a blatant return to a system that explicitly advantaged 
White Americans’ ideas of segregation in the K-12 setting and 
(later) preferential admissions in the higher education 
settings.14  
B. The Delusional Responses to Efforts to “Forcibly” Integrate 
Public Schools in the United States: The Development, Banning, 
and Approval of School Choice Models 
The pace of desegregation was painfully slow for Black 
Americans. Some school districts created school choice plans; 
these plans had various manifestations and avoided any 
meaningful integration of public schools. In Prince Edward 
County, Virginia, school choice manifested itself in the form of 
divestment.15 The school district decided to defund its public 
schools while creating a voucher program that would afford 
White students the equivalent of public education at segregated 
private schools.16 In New Kent County, Virginia, school choice 
took the form of freedom of choice plans.17 Under these plans, a 
student would generally be assigned to whichever school the 
student previously attended prior to the plan’s adoption unless 
the student’s parent made an official request to transfer to 
another school.18 
                                                                                                     
 14. See id. at 299 (“School authorities have the primary responsibility for 
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider 
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of 
the governing constitutional principles.”).  
 15. See generally Griffin, 377 U.S. 
 16. See id. at 221–26 (enacting a new tuition grant program and making 
school attendance a matter of local option). 
 17. See Green, 391 U.S. at 431 (allowing a pupil to choose his own public 
school).  
 18. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 433–34 
(1968) (stating that “each pupil except those entering the first and eighth 
grades, may annually choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools and 
pupils not making a choice were assigned to the school previously attended; first 
and eighth grade pupils must affirmatively choose a school.”).  
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As one might expect, freedom of choice plans did not result 
in schools that were substantially more desegregated than was 
the case immediately preceding the school desegregation cases.19 
Moreover, freedom of choice plans placed the onus of 
desegregating the nation’s public schools on Black parents and 
students as opposed to placing the burden of desegregation on 
the states that had sanctioned racial segregation in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
Some other districts, particularly those in the Deep South, 
arranged to supply vouchers for families to send their school-
age students to private sectarian schools, which were believed 
to have the right to discriminate on racial bases.21 Other White 
enclaves—or disproportionately White areas within 
predominately Black areas—chose o r  a t t e m p t e d  to secede 
from school districts and create alternative, predominately 
White school districts.22 This was especially the case of those 
districts subject to court supervision and ordered to 
desegregate under the watch of the federal courts.  
School districts outside of the Deep South were implicated in 
the school choice escape from integration as well. The Denver 
Public Schools chose to situate school buildings in areas that 
                                                                                                     
 19. See id. at 441–42 (“In three years of operation not a single white child 
has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled 
in New Kent school in 1967, 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend 
the all-Negro Watkins school.”).  
 20. See id. at 442 (describing how the plan operated simply to burden 
children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed on the 
School Board).  
 21. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 471 (1973) (vacating the 
decision of the lower court and holding that the Mississippi book-lending 
program was constitutionally infirm in that it significantly aided organization 
and continuation of separate system of private schools which might discriminate 
if they so desired). 
 22. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 482–83 
(1972) (stating that the city’s creation of a school district is not permissible 
when the effect of this districting would impede the dismantling of a dual 
system when the county school system had been found to be in violation of the 
Constitution); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 
490–91 (1972) (indicating that carving out a school district, in which 57% of 
students would be white while 43% would be African American is not permitted, 
when 89% of students in the remaining district frustrates attempts to eliminate 
a dual system). 
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would be prohibitive to attempts at desegregation.23 There 
seemed to be no end to the litany of ingenious and imaginative 
plans to disrupt efforts at desegregation. In the name of 
parents having free choice over the educational settings of their 
school-age students, White Americans thwarted attempts at 
segregation after having been successful at waiting out the 
national will to desegregate those same public schools. 
The Court saw fit to remedy many manifestations of school 
choice having seen these efforts as thinly veiled attempts to 
end-run desegregation attempts. The Court, until the mid-
1970s, judicially vetoed attempts to sidestep desegregation 
through school choice models, but one form of school choice 
proved friendly to the Court and remains contemporaneously 
insurmountable for advocates of desegregation. In Milliken v. 
Bradley I,24 the Court endorsed a “suburban veto”25 to 
desegregation attempts.26 Under the Court’s ruling in Milliken 
I, those seeking to avoid desegregation could relocate their 
residency to the suburbs and be absolved of responsibility to 
make right the immediate and lingering advantages that had 
resulted from the segregation of public schools.27 The curse of 
Milliken lives on and manifests itself as an obstacle to redress 
a past history of state-sponsored segregation as well as 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 
(1973) (describing how actions of a school board known to support racial and 
ethnic segregation that resulted in prohibited racially and ethnically 
segregated schools shifted the burden of proving that segregated schools in 
their district were not intentionally segregated). 
 24. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 761–62 (1974) [hereinafter 
Milliken I] (stating it was inappropriate to impose a multi-district solution when 
one district operated a unitary school system or acted in a way that effected 
segregation without allowing other districts to argue if that remedy was 
appropriate or provide evidence whether these other districts ran afoul of the 
Constitution). 
 25. See generally James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban 
Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635 (2004) (explaining how Brown extended the 
availability of school choice into our contemporary era and how that affects 
integration).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of 
American Public Education: the Court’s Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1597–1622 
(2003) (explaining how the court decisions aiming to end desegregation put 
American schools on a path towards greater inequality).  
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address the resegregation of the nation’s public schools. 
Ironically, Milliken’s effect mostly protects the right of 
northerners to avoid desegregation. Because school districts in 
the South are generally countywide and expansive, it is more 
difficult for those avoiding desegregation to vacate the school 
district without also moving well beyond reasonable driving 
distance to the benefits of the inner city.28  
The opposite is true in the North. Geographically smaller 
school districts allow for those avoiding school desegregation to 
dodge the desegregation of public schools while remaining well 
within reasonable commuting distance to the inner city, 
sometimes within the very same county.29 Thus, the Court—with 
its pronouncement in Milliken—created a pressure release 
valve for those attempting to avoid desegregation of the 
nation’s public schools, particularly in the North where school 
segregation was viewed as a southern problem.30 To be 
abundantly clear, the Court chose to prefer the interest of 
White Americans when attempting to remedy the wrongs of 
desegregation and to particularly dictate the pace of 
desegregation efforts.  
There was very little public interest, however, in 
desegregating the nation’s public schools; to the contrary, 
school districts created school choice plans that would protect 
the status quo of segregated public schools. The Court realized 
that these plans were for the purpose of avoiding the 
desegregation of the nation’s public schools and banned the 
use of those plans as methods for desegregating the nation’s 
public schools (at least as those plans were then constructed 
and applied). The Court went on to accept a later manifestation 
of school choice that allowed White parents to flee inner cities 
yet maintain the benefits of living close to the inner cities 
                                                                                                     
  28. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND 
RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2004) (analyzing how Brown's most visible 
effect—contact between students of different racial groups—has changed over 
the fifty years since the decision). 
 29. See id. at 8 (describing how it is not unusual for suburban school 
district to be small in the Northeast and Midwest, so that families living in some 
of the largest metropolitan areas in the country had dozens of school districts 
from which to choose). 
 30. See generally Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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that the parents had fled. Put most simply, the Court allowed 
White Americans to set the terms for desegregation of the 
nation’s public schools since White Americans would control 
the pace and scope of desegregation.  
White Americans would go on to use school choice to 
change the rules to desegregation attempts and change the 
conversation about school desegregation. School desegregation 
would become more about the right of parents to choose the 
setting(s) of their child’s schooling as opposed to providing for 
schooling in a desegregated context. When all was said and 
done, more was said than done: White Americans maintained 
power in the politics of education, even after the school 
desegregation cases. For many Black families and students, the 
current context of educational equity is often worse than was the 
case before attempts at desegregation.31 In effect, the 
desegregation of schools produced a different script because 
the actions after desegregation were new manifestations of 
power and privilege, but the desegregation of public schools 
in the United States produced the same caste since equitable 
access to public schools remained out of reach for nearly all 
Black school-aged children, especially if one defines equitable 
access as the ability to attend desegregated schools. 
III. How the Court’s Decisions in K-12 Desegregation Cases Led 
to Decisions in Later Affirmative Action Cases: Protecting the 
Power to Set House Rules 
The Court’s decisions regarding the desegregation of 
primary and secondary schools are instructive in the results of 
affirmative action cases in higher education. Though generally 
thought of as isolated lines of case law, the K-12 and higher 
education cases bear a striking resemblance to each other. The 
end result is the same: White Americans get to set the rules 
for the game. When White Americans can no longer win with 
                                                                                                     
 31. See GARY OREFIELD ET AL., E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING 
DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 42 (2012) (noting that school 
segregation across the United States is substantially worse than it was forty 
years ago and that black segregation is increasing in the Southern States and 
remains high in others). 
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the rules that they set, the Supreme Court’s role is to give its 
approbation to rule changes that are proposed by White 
Americans. Recall that the Court allowed White Americans to 
set the pace of the desegregation of the nation’s public schools. 
The Court did, however, order that the desegregation must 
appear to have occurred. When White Americans could no 
longer outlast the nation’s will for desegregated schools, the 
Court acquiesced in the proposal to allow White parents to opt 
out of school desegregation via the decision in Milliken I.32 
Milliken II, effectively the remedies portion of Milliken I, 
was decided in 1977.33 Only a year after Milliken II, the Court 
would entertain its first affirmative action case. That 
affirmative action case is similar to the K-12 desegregation 
cases because the result of that case (and subsequent affirmative 
action cases) was that White Americans would continue to enjoy 
academic environments that were for the most part free of Black 
students (and some other racial minorities). More than that, 
the cases are similar in that White Americans maintained the 
benefit of setting the house rules. As will be detailed below, 
the Court used the affirmative action cases to cement the power 
to control the house rules in favor of White Americans. This 
occurred in three phases. 
First, the Court would allow White Americans to determine 
which indicators were accorded the most weight in admissions 
processes. Of course, White applicants went on to choose the 
indicators that most benefitted them. The Court then went on 
to declare that White applicants who are presumptively more 
qualified than applicants who are racial minorities should not 
be denied admission into incoming classes.  
Next, the Court would allow the rule in the first case to 
transform to allow White applicants to challenge the 
admission of admittedly equally qualified applicants who are 
racial minorities. The Court entertained the second set of cases 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Milliken I, at 745 (1974) (“Conversely, without an interdistrict 
violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an 
interdistrict remedy.”). 
 33. See Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267, 289–91 (1977) [hereinafter 
Milliken II] (entitling as part of a desegregation decree, compensatory or 
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren subjected to past acts of de 
jure segregation at defrayed costs). 
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although there was no indication that the minority applicants 
were under- or unqualified as relative to the nonminority 
applicants. The chief complaint of the plaintiffs in those 
cases, therefore, was they could not believe that they would 
not be preferred even as compared to equally qualified racial 
minorities. Having lost this battle in the judiciary, the Court 
would later allow opponents of affirmative action in that same 
state to place the civil rights of minorities to a popular vote. 
Finally, the Court would let the power of house rules 
develop into the right of under- or unqualified White applicants 
to challenge the admission of more qualified minority 
candidates, almost assuring that White applicants would become 
mandatory winners. Not much in the K-12 context is different 
than in the context of affirmative action cases: racial minorities 
may pursue equity so long as White Americans are prohibitive 
favorites and perpetual winners in that pursuit. The following 
subsections of this Article will detail how the Supreme Court 
has maintained the White privilege to set the house rules as 
well as sanctioned the enhancement of that privilege. Indeed, 
this argument requires a recasting of the facts of affirmative 
action cases. 
A. More than Forgiveness on Their Terms: The Supreme Court 
Sanctions the White Power of “House Rules” via Bakke 
The Court first addressed the issue of programs that 
sought to include racial minorities who had previously been 
marginalized in higher education in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke.34 In sum, Allan Bakke, a white male 
applicant, applied for admission into the University of 
California-Davis Medical School.35 The University of California-
Davis Medical School operated two separate application review 
pools.36 One was aimed at white applicants and minorities who 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) 
(deciding that a medical school's admission program that used racial 
classifications violated the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the school's goals 
in using racial classifications could be legitimately served by the competitive 
consideration of race).  
 35. Id. at 276.  
 36. Id.  
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were not underrepresented in the Medical School.37 The other 
was aimed at minority applicants who were underrepresented at 
the Medical School.38 Bakke’s grade point average was slightly 
below the average of the White applicants from the general 
application pool and well above the average of those students 
admitted under the special application pool.39 Bakke’s 
standardized test scores far outpaced students accepted 
through either applicant pool.40 His interview received mixed 
reviews although the highest-ranking official of the 
admissions committee was not impressed with Bakke’s in-
person interview during Bakke’s second application cycle.41 After 
being denied admission to the Medical School in both 1973 and 
1974, Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, 
alleging that the admissions program constituted a violation of 
his right to equal protection of laws under the California and 
United States constitutions and a violation of Title VI of the 
                                                                                                     
 37. See id. at 274 (identifying the classes of persons eligible for the special 
admissions program). In 1973, applicants were considered under the special 
admissions program if they self-identified as “economically and/or educationally 
disadvantaged” on the 1973 application form. In 1974, applicants were eligible 
for the special admissions program if they self-identified on the 1974 application 
form as belonging to certain minority groups, effectively limited to “Blacks,” 
“Chicanos,” “Asians,” and “American Indians.” The term “disadvantaged” was 
not formally defined, but self-identified applicants had their applications 
reviewed for eligibility on a case-by-case basis. In 1974, the special admissions 
program only considered “disadvantaged” applicants who were members of one 
of the designated minority groups. Id. at 274–76.  
 38. See id. at 274–75 (stating that a special admissions program operated 
with a separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority 
groups).  
 39. See id. at 277 n.7 (comparing Bakke’s grade point averages with those 
of applicants admitted through the regular and special admissions programs in 
both the 1973 and 1974 application cycles). In 1973, Bakke’s overall grade point 
average was 0.03 points lower than the average for “regular” admittees and 0.58 
points higher than the average for “special” admittees. In 1974, Bakke’s overall 
grade point average was 0.17 points higher than the average for “regular” 
admittees and 0.84 points higher than the average for “special” admittees. Id.  
 40. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (comparing 
Bakke’s MCAT percentiles with those of applicants admitted through both the 
regular and special admissions programs in both the 1973 and 1974 application 
cycles). 
 41. See id. at 276–77 (noting that Bakke’s faculty interviewer in 1973 
considered Bakke “a very desirable applicant” while his faculty interviewer in 
1974 gave Bakke his lowest rating out of six reviewers’ scores). 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he could not compete for the 
16 (out of 100) seats reserved for underrepresented racial 
minorities.42 The California trial court determined that the 
Medical School’s admission program violated the United States 
and California constitutions and Title VI, but that Bakke had 
not sufficiently shown he would have been admitted but for the 
special admissions program.43 The case was then transferred 
directly to the California Supreme Court, which ultimately 
determined that the admissions program violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and that 
Bakke was entitled to admission because the university could 
not show that Bakke would not have been admitted even 
without the special admissions program.44 After granting 
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held in favor of 
Bakke and ordered the Medical School to admit Bakke in 
contravention of the Medical School’s desires.45 
The Court’s decision in Bakke privileged White applicants 
seeking admission into competitive state-sponsored academic 
programs. Despite the fact that every applicant was evaluated 
on a number of criteria, Allan Bakke argued for and the Court 
approved that his test scores would become the primary 
measure for his suitability for enrollment at the University of 
California-Davis Medical School.46 Surely, Bakke’s test scores 
and grade point average far outpaced those of the applicants 
admitted under the special program, but it is uncontested that 
the director of admissions found Bakke’s interview to be 
lacking on numerous accounts.47 Setting aside the exceptional 
test scores that Mr. Bakke submitted and the fairly competitive 
grade point average achieved in his coursework, there was no 
particularly explicit reason why Mr. Bakke’s poor performance 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 277–78. 
 43. Id. at 277–79. 
 44. Id. at 279–81. 
 45. Id. at 271–72. 
 46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–280 (1978).  
 47. See id. at 276–77 (describing how Bakke had written to the chairman of 
the admissions committee complaining about the special admissions program 
after being denied admittance in 1973 and how, in 1974, that same person 
conducted Bakke’s faculty interview and subsequently gave Bakke his lowest 
rating out of all reviewers). 
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on the interview portion of his admissions process was to be 
excused.48 The only reasonable reason for ordering Allan 
Bakke’s admission into the Medical School in spite of his poor 
interview was that the rules would be different for White 
applicants than for applicants from underrepresented racial 
minority groups. All applicants would be measured by several 
measures, but White applicants would get to weigh the 
application process in a manner that highlighted their strengths 
as opposed to weaknesses. Thus, White applicants would be 
assured to be perpetual winners in the higher education 
application process. 
That the Court sought to shift the rules to maintain the 
privileged position of White applicants to elite state schools is 
evident in at least one other instance of the Court’s opinion in 
Bakke. Diversity was to be considered a variety of soft factors 
after the decision in Bakke.49 Relying on language from the 
admission process at Harvard University, the Court sanctioned 
the use of various forms of diversity that go beyond racial and 
ethnic diversity.50 While such measures are not in conflict with 
efforts towards racial diversity, they may be if such efforts at 
diversity displace efforts at racial diversity with race-neutral 
efforts at diversity that maintain the privileged position of 
White applicants. This can easily become the case when 
accounting for sex, class, religion, geography, etc. The categories 
promoted by Harvard’s policy are not exact proxies for race, 
and they may actually be more beneficial to White applicants 
who are still the majority of applicants in each of these areas 
by nature of their majority in the general population. Once 
again, the Court expressed a willingness to protect the privileged 
position of White applicants at the expense of minority 
applicants. The Court approved the consideration of diversity, 
but only insofar as diversity would also benefit White 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. (declining to expressly consider whether Bakke’s interviewers in 
1974 were explicitly biased against Bakke, nor otherwise questioning the 
validity of Bakke’s 1974 interview scores). 
 49. See id. at 317 (explaining that ethnic diversity could be considered a 
“plus” factor as part of a matrix of other nonobjective factors). 
 50. See id. at 316–20 (stating that race or ethnic background is simply one 
element to be weighted fairly against other elements).  
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applicants while benefiting racial and ethnic minority 
applicants. 
B. Changing the “House Rules”: Grutter, Gratz, and the 
Preference for Whites over Equally Qualified Black, Brown, and 
Native Applicants 
Notwithstanding the result in Bakke, most people would 
sympathize with Mr. Bakke. Under what he perceived to be 
the objective standard of evaluating merit, Mr. Bakke believed 
himself to have outclassed the competition on this “objective” 
measures. It is easy to understand how the admissions 
committee might have rejected Allan Bakke given his poor 
performance at his in-person interview (on the second 
application). The Supreme Court, however, appeared to bless 
White applicants for admission into higher education with a 
right to admission, at least as preferred against racial 
minorities. The Court allowed Bakke to determine which 
criteria for merit was given greater weight in his admissions 
process. Although it was well understood that minority 
applicants would have to do well on both the objective and 
subjective portions of the application process, Bakke’s results 
changed the rules for nonminority applicants. Under the new 
rules, White applicants’ admissibility could practically be 
measured by performance on standardized tests alone.51 The 
effect of this rule change in combination with the Court’s lack 
of resolve to end segregation in the nation’s public elementary 
and secondary schools was that White Americans were able to 
avoid the presence of minority students throughout their 
educational experiences. 
The Court did not hear another case on affirmative action 
until roughly twenty-five years after Bakke. The Supreme 
Court would hear two cases from the same university at that 
time. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court upheld the 
use of affirmative action measures in the admissions decisions 
                                                                                                     
 51. See id. at 320 (stating that Medical School could not carry its burden of 
proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, 
respondent still would not have been admitted). 
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at the University of Michigan’s law school. 52 The Supreme 
Court preceded its decision in Grutter by striking down the use 
of affirmative action measures in the admissions decisions for 
undergraduate students at the University of Michigan in 
Gratz v. Bollinger.53 The law school and undergraduate 
admissions processes contained different fact patterns and, 
therefore, produced variant rulings according to the Court.  
The University of Michigan’s law school individually 
scrutinized each applicant and whether the applicant could use 
life experiences to influence the culture of the law school.54 
Barbara Grutter, a white female applicant from Michigan, 
applied for admission into the law school at the University of 
Michigan.55 The University of Michigan’s law school is 
considered one of the most prestigious public law schools in 
the United States and is perennially considered to be one of 
the most sought after law schools (whether public or private) 
by most peer institutions and law school applicants.56 Given the 
competitive nature of admissions into the law school, many 
applicants—including Barbara Grutter—did not receive 
affirmative admissions decisions during her application cycle.57 
To the contrary, the undergraduate admissions process at the 
University of Michigan afforded a set amount of points, twenty 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) (holding that the 
affirmative action admissions program at University of Michigan Law school, 
which used a strict points system to grade applicants and allotted points for the 
applicants’ racial diversity, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 53. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) (holding that the 
University’s use of race in its current freshman admissions policy was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ asserted interest in diversity, 
violating the Equal Protection Clause). 
 54. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (“Focusing on students’ academic ability 
coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential, 
the policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all 
the information available in the file. . .”).  
 55. See id. at 316–17 (describing how Barbara Grutter had a 3.8 GPA and a 
161 LSAT score). 
 56. See id. at 313 (stating that the law school receives more than 3,500 
applications each year for a class of around 350 students). 
 57. See id. at 313–17 (explaining that the law school received more than 
ten times as many applicants as there were seats available for the entering class 
and that Grutter was initially placed on the waiting list and then rejected). 
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to be exact, to all racial minorities.58 The purported effect of 
the addition of twenty points was that “virtually every 
qualified underrepresented minority applicant [was] 
admitted.”59  
Jennifer Gratz applied for admission to the University of 
Michigan as an incoming freshman for the fall semester in 
1995.60 She was denied admission.61 Patrick Hamacher applied 
for admission as an incoming freshman for the fall semester 
in 1997.62 Like Jennifer Gratz, Hamacher was denied 
admission into his sought after incoming class.63 The Court 
struck down the University of Michigan’s use of affirmative 
action in its undergraduate admissions process.64  
Though the Supreme Court states that Michigan 
affirmative action cases present different issues, that 
statement does not confront the striking similarities of the 
plaintiffs’ arguments. The arguments in both Grutter and Gratz 
are the same: White applicants should be preferred to Black 
applicants who are admittedly equally qualified. In both 
Michigan cases, there is never an allegation that racial 
minorities who received admission to the University of Michigan 
were under- or unqualified.65 Moreover, in both cases the 
plaintiffs accepted—as was required by the circumstances—that 
the racial minorities at issue were just as qualified as the 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 258 (2003) (noting that an 
applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is 
automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission). 
 59. Id. at 244, 274. 
 60. See id. at 251 (stating that Gratz’s admission had been delayed because 
she was “well qualified” but “less competitive than the students who had been 
admitted on first review” and then rejected).  
 61. See id. (noting that after LSA rejected her, she enrolled in the 
University of Michigan at Dearborn and graduated in the spring of 1999).  
 62. See id. (rejecting his application in April 1997).  
 63. See id. (delaying his application initially because his “academic 
credentials were in the qualified range” but “were not at the level needed for 
first review admission.”).  
 64. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down the 
undergraduate admissions policy because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve 
asserted compelling interest in diversity).  
 65. Id. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
337–38 (2003). 
DIFFERENT SCRIPT, SAME CASTE 317 
White plaintiffs.66 Were this not the case, the plaintiffs’ cases 
would be moot since the plaintiffs would then be asserting that 
they, themselves, would be under- or unqualified for 
admission. The plaintiffs’ arguments in Grutter and Gratz 
stands in juxtaposition to the argument presented in Bakke, 
where the allegation—however misguided—was that Bakke 
was more qualified than the admitted racial minorities on 
some measures. The cases of Grutter and Gratz differed from 
the case of Bakke in that there was scantly an argument that 
minorities were under or unqualified; the facts dictated that 
minority applicants were viewed as equally as qualified as the 
non-admitted White applicants.  
White Americans, the setters and keepers of the house 
rules, needed to change the rules to fit this new reality. There 
needed to be a path to assure White applicants would be 
preferred over not only purportedly under- or unqualified 
minority applicants but also equally qualified minority 
applicants. The Court’s decision to even hear a case premised 
largely on the fact that the University of Michigan admitted 
several minority applicants over an equally qualified White 
applicant where there were a limited number of available seats 
signaled a shift in the rules. There was a new rule of equality 
and equity: in a battle of equally qualified minority and 
nonminority applicants, White applicants could force 
universities to explain why Black candidates were chosen 
over White candidates. Not shockingly, the non-admitted White 
applicants in Grutter and Gratz failed to challenge the 
admission of White applicants who were both less qualified 
than the non-admitted White plaintiffs and were also admitted 
into their respective programs. With this being the case, it is 
difficult to agree that the plaintiffs in the University of 
Michigan cases were forthright in alleging that the gravamen 
of their cases were that minority students were preferred in 
the University of Michigan’s admissions processes; instead, the 
                                                                                                     
 66. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Every applicant admitted under the current plan, petitioners do 
not here dispute, is qualified under the current plan”), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
337–38 (“With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority 
students admitted by the Law School have been deemed qualified.”). 
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true issue here was that minority applicants—no matter how 
qualified—were selected above White applicants. 
The Court’s analysis of difference misses the mark on 
another similarity of Grutter and Gratz. Both cases fail to 
acknowledge that qualified minority applicants might 
contribute to the diversity of the student body in intersectional 
manners. In both cases, the Court counts the sheer number 
of racial minorities, but the Court fails to acknowledge the 
unique intersections between the status of racial minorities as 
individuals. The Court and the plaintiffs assume that all 
racial minorities are the same. The Court’s error manifests 
itself differently in both cases. In Grutter, the Court argues 
that the law school’s process accounts for other forms of 
diversity allowing for nonracial minorities to take advantage of 
the individualized review process.67 In Gratz, the Court asserts 
that the twenty-point value assigned to racial minorities is 
determinative in the admissions process assuring that 
“virtually every” underrepresented racial minority was 
admitted.68 The assertion ignores the fact that those students 
might have collected points for being both Native American 
and the nation’s premier oboist. Likewise, one could have 
received points for both being Latina and a prized 
entrepreneur. Similarly, one could have received points for 
being a Black female who was raised in poverty yet also an 
exalted scientist. In many ways, the Court’s handling of the 
Michigan cases proved that racial minorities were and 
remained to be considered static beings who contribute to 
diversity in a very limited manner while White applicants are 
dynamic and contribute to diversity in a plethora of ways. This 
was not a new rule; this was simply a shifting of the rules 
pertaining to diversity.  
                                                                                                     
 67. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“Here, the Law School engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse 
educational environment.”). 
 68. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274 (explaining that awarding 20 points to 
minorities ignores each student’s individual characteristics that contribute to 
diversity). The Court’s analysis did not consider racial minorities who might 
have been admitted without the 20 points. 
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White applicants in the Michigan cases merely took 
advantage of the rule created in Bakke: diversity was 
acceptable so long as diversity allowed White applicants to be 
presumptive and perpetual winners in admission to prestigious 
state-sponsored universities. White applicants could now, 
however, publicly call to question universities when that 
presumption did not bear proper and appropriate results (i.e., 
White students being admitted to competitive state universities 
at the near exclusion of Black and Brown students). The Court’s 
involvement in the Gratz and Grutter cases would pave the 
way for a broader and more appalling change to the rules of 
access and equity in college admissions. 
C. The Debate Moves Between Un(der)qualified Whites and 
Qualified Minorities: Under New House Rules Whites 
Must Always Win 
In 2013, the Supreme Court f i rs t  heard the case of 
Abigail Fisher, a White woman denied admission to the 
prestigious University of Texas at Austin.69 The facts of Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin70 are also relatively simple. The 
University of Texas at Austin automatically admits all students 
graduating in the top decile of their graduating classes from 
public high schools in the state of Texas.71 These seats 
comprise about four of every five seats in the incoming class 
at the University of Texas’ Austin campus.72 The remaining 
seats—as few as they are—are filled through a holistic review 
process that assesses an applicant’s academic performance in 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming the Supreme Court order remanding the case to the Court of Appeals 
and denying the University’s motion to remand the case to District Court). 
 70. See generally id. (holding that University had demonstrated that race-
conscious holistic review was necessary to make Top Ten Percent plan workable 
by patching holes that mechanical admissions program left in its ability to 
achieve rich diversity that contributed to its academic mission). 
 71. See id. at 637 (stating that Fisher did not graduate in the top ten 
percent of her class and did not therefore qualify for automatic admission under 
the Top Ten Percent Plan, which that year took 81% of the seats available for 
Texas residents). 
 72. Id. 
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combination with the applicant’s personal achievements and 
contributions to diversity.73 There are no specific weights or 
parameters for identifying and measuring diversity.74 Although 
all applicants may merit an individual review of their 
application, the University does exclude some students not in 
the top decile of their graduating classes in Texas from 
further consideration based on inadequate academic 
performance alone.75 Abigail Fisher did not complete high 
school in the top ten percent of her graduating class although 
she did graduate from a high school in Texas.76 She was later 
excluded from further consideration for admission to the 
University of Texas at Austin due to test scores, grades and 
high school course selection that the University of Texas deemed 
inadequate as compared to the other applications not 
automatically admitted, notwithstanding whether those 
applicants were minority or nonminority.77  
Abigail Fisher, disappointed with her inability to achieve 
admission into the elite public university of her home state, 
sued alleging that the University’s efforts to admit Black and 
Brown students prevented her admission to the University of 
Texas at Austin.78 The case was heard at the United States 
District Court for Western Texas, which awarded summary 
judgment in favor of the University of Texas.79 The generally 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. at 637 (describing how Fisher became one of 17,131 applicants 
for the remaining 1,216 seats for Texas residents because she was considered 
under the holistic review program, which looks past class rank to evaluate each 
applicant as an individual based on his or her achievements and experiences). 
 74. See id. at 638 (stating that race is a factor considered in the unique 
context of applicant’s entire experience, and it may be a beneficial factor for a 
minority or non-minority student).  
 75. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (explaining 
how Abigail Fisher would have not been admitted because her Academic Index 
Score was assessed at 3.1, and no students under 3.5 were admitted under 
holistic review). 
 76. See id. at 637 (stating the circumstances in which Fisher had graduated 
high school). 
 77. Id. at 638–39. 
 78. See id. at 644–45 (implying that Fisher’s concern was that students 
who are racial minorities and not her poor performance was the reason she was 
denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin). 
 79. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 613 (W.D. 
Tex. 2009) (stating that as long as Grutter remained good law, the University’s 
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conservative Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s issuance of summary judgment.80 The Supreme Court 
vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case to the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings.81 On 
remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed summary judgment.82 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, oral arguments were held on 
December 9, 2015,83 and the Court has since upheld the 
University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in its holistic review 
process.84 
Although the federal court’s rulings in previous cases 
pertaining to education and race, particularly affirmative action 
cases, were troubling, that the federal courts would entertain 
Abigail Fisher’s case sets aside all previous understandings of 
the role of race in education. In doing so, the federal courts 
authorized and effectively reified the right of all Whites to 
challenge the very presence of Black and Brown students on 
selective, public university campuses. As noted in previous 
sections, the plaintiff in Bakke argued that he was more 
qualified than the racial minorities admitted through the 
Affirmative Action program at the University of California-
Davis Medical School.85 The plaintiffs in both Grutter and Gratz 
argued that they were just as qualified as the racial minorities 
                                                                                                     
admissions program was constitutional). 
 80. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“Finally it is neither our role nor purpose to dance from Grutter’s firm holding 
that diversity is an interest supporting compelling necessity.”). 
 81. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2412 (2013) 
[hereinafter Fisher I] (holding that the Court of Appeals did not apply the 
correct standard of scrutiny). 
 82. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“With the benefit of additional briefing, oral argument, and the 
ordered exacting scrutiny, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.”). 
 83. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888, 2888 (2015) 
[hereinafter Fisher II] (granting certiorari); see also Fisher v. University of 
Texas, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981 (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) 
(outlining the status of Fisher II). 
 84. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2202 (2016) 
(holding that the university’s admissions program did not violate equal 
protection).  
 85. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–81 (1978) 
(explaining the Plaintiff’s argument that less qualified students were being 
admitted and thus he was being discriminated against based on his race). 
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who were admitted through the University of Michigan’s 
affirmative action programs.86 Bakke, Grutter and Gratz all 
brought into question which qualifications were most 
important.87 Fisher’s argument diverged from the previous 
arguments, although those arguments were also weak in 
nature and privileged White Americans, in that Fisher’s 
argument was never that she was more or as equally as 
qualified as the minorities applicants who were admitted to 
the University of Texas at Austin.88 Abigail Fisher did not 
finish her high school experience ranked in the top ten percent 
of her graduating class; thus, she was ineligible for automatic 
admission into the University.89  
The University offered Fisher another chance at admission 
through a holistic review process that evaluated her 
qualifications outside of class rank.90 The holistic review process 
afforded 17,131 applicants as chance at 1,216 remaining seats in 
the freshmen class at the University of Texas at Austin.91 The 
applicant pool for holistic review is dramatically and drastically 
more academically competitive than the applicant pool of 
                                                                                                     
 86. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (explaining that 
petitioner felt she was discriminated against because she was denied admission 
although she had credentials similar to applicants from disfavored racial groups 
who had a greater chance of being admitted); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 251–57 (2003) (detailing the admissions process used by the 
University of Michigan and how the petitioners’ scores compared to qualified 
minority students’ scores). 
 87. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276–81 (explaining that Bakke challenged the 
assessment of his merit that placed the totality of his qualification in a less 
favorable measurement in relation to his test scores, which by far outpaced 
most, if not all, other candidates); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 (describing 
the admission system used and detailing the petitioners’ argument that the 
objective components of their applications—grade point average and test 
scores—should outweigh the composite assessment of total qualifications of 
minority applicants); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251–57 (describing the admission 
system used). 
 88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(arguing that the University’s race-conscious admissions program violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 89. See id. (detailing Fisher’s academic achievements and qualifications). 
 90. See id. (evaluating each applicant as an individual based on his or her 
experiences).  
 91. See id. (stating that 81% of the seats available for Texas residents were 
taken by students qualifying under the Top Ten Percent Plan the year Fisher 
applied).  
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students graduating in the top decile of their high school 
graduating classes in public high schools in Texas.92 Even for 
the most competitive applicants, the competition would be 
fierce; approximately seven percent of applicants are offered 
admission through the holistic review process.93 Fisher was not, 
however, the most competitive applicant; in fact, Abigail 
Fisher was not even minimally qualified.94 No applicant—
whether minority or nonminority—was admitted at or below 
Fisher’s Academic Index, which takes into account an 
applicant’s test scores, grades and high school coursework.95 
Fisher was excluded for falling below the minimum Academic 
Index required for further consideration for admissions into 
the University of Texas.96 The reality is that Fisher was not 
admitted in her application cycle without any fault at all 
assigned to efforts to admit minority applicants.97 
 It is also not true that Abigail Fisher did not get admitted 
because of her mediocre academic credentials, as has been 
argued. Abigail Fisher was not admitted to the University of 
Texas at Austin in 2008 because her qualifications were 
lackluster and otherwise below minimal expectations. Abigail 
Fisher was under- or un-qualified for admission into the 
University of Texas. In fact, Fisher alternatively argued that 
the University should have altered its selection process for the 
benefit of admitting her (and other White applicants) into the 
class.98 The plaintiff argues for complete reliance on the “Top 
                                                                                                     
 92. See id. at 650 (stating that the Top Ten Percent students had an 
average standardized test score of 1219, 66 points lower than the average 
standardized test score of 1285 attained by holistic review admittees).  
 93. See id. at 637–38 (explaining that 81 percent of available spots were 
filled by students in the top 10% of their class, so the rest of the remaining 
applicants would be admitted through the holistic review process and that 
17,131 applicants competed for 1,216 seats). 
 94. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir. 
2014) (describing how Fisher’s “Academic Index” scores were too low for 
admission to her preferred academic programs at UT Austin). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 639 (explaining how the University did not admit students 
unless their AI exceeded 3.5, and Fisher’s was 3.1).  
 97. See generally id. 
 98. See id. at 656 (discussing Abigail Fisher’s argument that socio-economic 
status would be a race-neutral method of assuring racial diversity). In doing so, 
the Fifth Circuit explains that socio-economic status would benefit White 
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Ten Percent” plan, which would have ironically left her without 
admission but might have resulted in fewer Black and Brown 
admittees or for reliance on class, which maintains privilege for 
White Americans (although not particularly Fisher).99 Both the 
Top Ten Percent plan and the holistic review processes 
overrepresented Whites in the admissions process.100 It appears 
that Fisher would only be satisfied if White applicants were 
absolute and perpetual winners in relation to Black and Brown 
applicants in the admissions process at the University of 
Texas at Austin. In other words, White applicants would have to 
be collective mandatory winners in Fisher’s mind, even if Abigail 
Fisher, herself, would have to suffer exclusion to maintain the 
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities at the 
University of Texas’ Austin campus.  
Still, the federal courts heard Fisher’s case. That the 
federal courts entertained Abigail Fisher’s case is a great 
departure from the Court’s previous affirmative action cases. 
Never had the Court considered whether universities were 
required to admit unqualified applicants solely because the 
applicants were White (which is the case here since Abigail 
Fisher never claimed to be as equally qualified as any 
admitted student, regardless of race or ethnicity, but merely 
offers to redefine the qualifications to advantage herself). 
Moreover, such consideration was and remains a departure 
from the expectations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: that similarly situated people are 
treated similarly.101 Fisher was not similarly situated to 
                                                                                                     
applicants because White applicants who have low socio-economic status 
substantially outnumber Black applicants who are have low socio-economic 
statuses. Id.  
 99. See id. (explaining that there are many more White Americans than 
Black or Brown Americans in poverty in terms of absolute numbers; thus, 
reliance on class would result in larger numbers of White applicants being 
admitted through the holistic review process than Black or Brown applicants). 
 100. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 657 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that Black and Latino students admitted through the holistic review 
process represented only 3.3% of all students admitted into the University of 
Texas in Abigail Fisher’s application year). 
 101. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illustrating that the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ban disparate treatment of similarly situated persons). 
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minorities or non-minorities who were admitted (or even 
considered and not admitted) since she did not exhibit the 
minimum qualifications to merit further consideration. 
Setting aside Fisher’s lack of qualifications, the federal 
court’s entertaining of Fisher is problematic for a number of 
other reasons. The University of Texas at Austin admits many 
times more White applicants through its holistic review process 
than it does Black or Brown applicants.102 Abigail Fisher 
argues, in part, that the admission of Black and Brown 
applicants is the reason for her failure to receive admission 
into the University of Texas at Austin.103 Fisher’s argument 
fails to acknowledge that the number of White students 
admitted through the holistic review process is many times more 
than that of Black and Brown students.104 Likewise, the number 
of White students admitted through the holistic review process 
is five-fold that of Brown students.105 With such 
overwhelming preference for White applicants, it is 
abundantly clear that Fisher’s assertion that Black and 
Brown students stand in the way of her admission is, and 
was at the time of her complaint, erroneous.  
Moreover, the message to Black and Brown Americans is 
clear: White Americans must not only be advantaged in the 
college admissions process, but White Americans must also 
win every time. As mentioned above, Abigail Fisher was 
woefully un(der)qualified and ill-equipped to compete with the 
much more qualified applicants—both minority and 
nonminority—in the University of Texas at Austin’s applicant 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that University of Texas’ College of Social Work had a quarter 
Hispanic and more than 10% African-American students, the College of 
Education had 22.4% Hispanic and 10.1% African American students and the 
College of Business Administration had only 14.5% Hispanic and 3.4% African-
American students). 
 103. See id. at 217 (arguing that the UT’s admissions policies discriminated 
against them on the basis of race in violation of their right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 104. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 663, 661 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(portraying the admission compositions of the income class from 1996 to 2008).  
 105. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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pool.106 Instead of the federal courts encouraging Fisher to work 
harder and apply for admission at a later time or consider 
other educational or occupational pursuits, Black and Brown 
Americans—who have worked hard to gather the requisite 
qualifications for admission—have been targeted as the 
primary reason for Abigail Fisher’s poor performance. It is 
unmistakable that the core of Abigail Fisher’s argument and the 
federal courts’ entertaining of her case is that even unqualified 
White applicants may request further vetting of admitted 
minority applicants, for it is apparently unreasonable to assume 
that some racial and ethnic minorities might be better qualified 
that any or all White applicants. 
Moreover, Abigail Fisher’s analysis of the few Black and 
Brown students admitted fails to recognize that Black and 
Brown students may contribute to diversity in ways that extend 
beyond their racial identities, just as the case was in Gratz and 
Grutter. The Supreme Court has mandated that race not be 
the sole determinant of admission or rejection from admission 
to public universities in the United States.107 The Court has 
encouraged universities to consider various forms of diversity 
in selecting their incoming classes.108 Despite this order, 
Fisher and the Court refuse to acknowledge that Black and 
Brown students might contribute to diversity in numerous 
manners. The admission classes in recent Supreme Court 
cases have counted the numbers and percentages of Black and 
Brown students without mentioning that these students might 
contribute to diversity in a number of ways. According to Abigail 
Fisher’s arguments, even constitutionally compliant affirmative 
action plans are racial quotas or programs that limit the seats 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Fisher, 758 F.3d, at 638–39 (explaining that nearly all the seats in 
the undeclared major program in Liberal Arts were filled with Top Ten Percent 
students, so Fisher would not have been admitted with her Academic Index 
score). This suggests that Fisher’s rejection was not a near-miss but rather an 
indication that her qualifications were no match for her competitors. Id. 
 107. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) (concluding that the 
University’s policy of distributing 20 points to every single “underrepresented 
minority” applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve 
educational diversity). 
 108. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (stating that an 
admissions program must be flexible enough to consider all elements of 
diversity). 
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open to White applicants.109 This argument should fail on the 
grounds that it is conceivable and generally provable that 
Black and Brown applicants have diverse experiences that are 
intersectional. Why might a White male also be a great chess 
player, a Peace Corp volunteer or activist while the same is 
not true for Black and Brown males? How could a White 
female contribute to the diversity of a school through her 
experience as a sexual orientation minority, a single mother, or 
as an athlete, but a Black female or Latina not have the 
same ability? The assumption and lack of investigation into 
such intersectionality is troubling, if not racist, in and of itself. 
Thus, while Abigail Fisher and the federal courts encourage 
society to view the various frames of diversity that White 
applicants might provide, the same parties encourage society to 
view Black and Brown applicants as only providing a very static 
example of diversity. 
Another display of the use of house rules in Fisher addresses 
the irony of the inability of Black and Brown people to use 
disparate impact analysis in cases relying upon the Equal 
Protection Clause. To avail oneself of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Black and Brown plaintiffs must prove not only 
impact, but also intent.110 While the same is definitely true of 
White plaintiffs, it is troubling that the full or near full 
exclusion of Black and Brown people from some segments of 
life is not quite grounds for a lawsuit based on the Equal 
Protection Clause. Here, as is usually the case, only a few 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Fisher, 758 F.3d, at 646 (rebutting argument that the University of 
Texas’ Affirmative Action plan was a racial quota merely because there was the 
potential of using race as one of many factors in admissions decisions). 
 110. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (arguing that 
disparate impact alone is not enough to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
invalidate a statute and explaining that the complainant must show an 
invidious motive for passing and implementing the challenged statute). In 
Washington v. Davis, the court denied the challenge of Black applicants aspiring 
to become police officers. Although race was mentioned as one part of the 
secondary review at the University of Texas-Austin, all parties could avail 
themselves of this advantage. Thus, the statute was facially neutral and should 
not have been eligible of an Equal Protection Clause challenge. The University 
of Texas-Austin does not pretend that the secondary review does not assist 
racial and ethnic minorities, but the University of Texas-Austin also does not 
have control over the construction of the processes by which students are 
admitted into the university. Id. 
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White people, who were un(der)qualified for admission, were 
denied admission into the incoming class. Although the 
admissions process is generally known to be very competitive, 
the fact that even one Black or Brown person is offered 
admission ahead of a White person is the crux of Fisher’s 
frustrations. It is becoming customary for White applicants 
disgruntled with their mediocre or subpar performance to 
blame not all accepted applicants but only applicants who are 
racial or ethnic minorities. Given that education is a commodity 
that allows for entry into a higher educational, social, and 
occupational class, it is no shock that litigants such as Fisher 
are interested in limiting these opportunities for applicants 
who are racial or ethnic minorities. While the Court, according 
to its precedent, would not find the general exclusion of racial 
minorities to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
very suggestion of a White applicant—no matter how robust, 
moderate, or shabby his or her qualifications are as compared to 
only students who are racial and/or ethnic minorities—demands 
the most exacting review of the federal courts. 
D. Schuette v. BAMN: Raising the Policy-Sanctioning Bar for 
Affirmative Action Policies 
The Court’s consideration of Fisher was striking for many 
reasons. 111 First, the case approving of the University of Texas 
at Austin’s use of affirmative action originated in the Fifth 
Circuit, long known for its conservative opinions. Having 
survived the scrutiny of the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
effectively punted Fisher back to the Fifth Circuit. This is 
perhaps because the Court was unwilling or otherwise 
hesitant to so quickly overrule its decision in Grutter. In many 
ways, no one got what they expected in Fisher. Proponents of 
educational equity through affirmative action feared the 
overturning of Grutter and likely the end of affirmative 
action. Opponents of affirmative action were hopeful for the 
worst fears of proponents of affirmative action. At the last 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 
2014) (alleging that the University’s race-conscious admissions program 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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stroke of the federal courts’ pens, very little drama had taken 
place. Much more was feared and hoped than was done in 
actuality. The Supreme Court would, however, sanction the 
changing of the house rules—yet again—in less than one year. 
In Schuette v. BAMN112, the Court would allow opponents of 
affirmative action to specifically burden proponents of affirmative 
action with the task of amending the constitution to achieve 
educational equity through opening the doors to state higher 
education campuses. 
Having failed to defeat affirmative action in Fisher and 
more importantly, Grutter, the conservative wing of the 
Supreme Court issued a potential vanquishing blow to 
affirmative action policies in Schuette. The Court allowed 
White populations to place the civil rights of minorities to a 
vote when the court approved of a Michigan ban on race-based 
affirmative action plans that favored racial minorities.113 The 
Court gave a nod to the Michigan constitutional amendment 
although other forms of affirmative action such as alumni, 
athletic and donor preferences—all with racial implications 
albeit indirectly—were not similarly targeted by the 
amendment.114 The relevant facts of Schuette are simple to 
recite. As a result of their inability to have affirmative action 
programs at the University of Michigan struck down as facial 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, opponents of 
affirmative action in Michigan sought to ban racial equity in 
higher education at state-sponsored universities via a 
statewide referendum on the rights of minorities.115 The state of 
Michigan placed the civil rights of Black, Brown, and American 
Indian would-be-students to a popular vote. Not surprisingly, a 
                                                                                                     
 112. See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1623 (2014) (holding that no 
authority in United States Constitution would allow judiciary to set aside 
amendment to Michigan Constitution prohibiting affirmative action in public 
education, employment, and contracting).  
 113. See id. at 1624 (questioning whether voters in the States may 
choose to prohibit the consideration of such racial preferences).  
 114. See id. at 1629 (stating that under the amendment, race-based 
preferences cannot be part of the admissions process for state universities).  
 115. See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court 
discards those precedents that recognized that when the majority 
reconfigures the political process in a manner that burdens only a racial 
minority, that alteration triggers strict scrutiny). 
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predominately White electorate voted to cease and desist efforts 
at achieving educational equality for Black, Brown, and 
American Indian students in Michigan. With its endorsement of 
Michigan’s actions, the Supreme Court of the United States 
would allow White Americans to change the house rules. No 
longer were the rules that civil rights should not be voted 
upon by the general public; the new rule would be that civil 
rights are up for public debate and vote.116 
It is hard to conceptualize a change of rules more drastic 
than what occurred in Schuette. In the most obvious manner, 
opponents of affirmative action in Michigan changed not only 
the rules but also the nature of the game itself. Efforts at civil 
rights have seldom gained steam among popular voters. It is for 
this reason that the federal courts have intervened to protect 
civil rights of minorities from the tyranny of the majority. 
Schuette gives every racial minority solid reasons for doubting 
those who argue towards trusting the political system with 
the civil rights of minorities.117 By definition,  as a minority, 
these groups are unable to win elections that pit their political 
aims against the political aims of the majority.118 It is 
unnecessary to look to recent history for this concept as 
applied to racial minorities. Consider the following examples. 
One can only imagine the results if White American 
Southerners had been asked to vote on the end of slavery. Well, 
there is not much need for imagination: we know what 
happened when White American Southerners considered voting 
on the end of slavery. Southern states voted to secede from the 
United States. Later,  the most costly war in our nation’s 
history—in terms of human lives—was waged to resolve this 
very question. More appropriate to this Article, White 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. at 1629 (stating that some voters in Michigan set out to 
eliminate the use of race-sensitive admissions policies and that Proposal 2 
was passed by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent). 
 117. See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that the only policy 
a Michigan citizen may not seek through the process used by everything else is 
a race-sensitive admissions policy that considers race in an individualized 
manner when it is clear that race-neutral alternatives are not adequate to 
achieve diversity). 
 118. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015) (defining “minority” as “the 
smaller in number of two groups constituting a whole; specifically: a group 
having less than the number of votes necessary for control.”). 
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Americans were asked to vote—through the integration of 
schools—on a movement towards educational equity for racial 
minorities by way of school desegregation. We need not 
postulate the results of that vote although there was never a 
formal election on the issue. The resolution of that question 
also involved federal troops although to a m uc h  lesser 
capacity than the Civil War. Public opinion, as requested by the 
Supreme Court, never reached a point that would afford 
racial minorities adequate, equitable, or equal educational 
opportunities. Because of the difficulties of being a minority 
and having political goals in direct opposition to the majority, 
the Supreme Court had previously frowned upon the act of 
putting the civil rights of minorities to a vote or subjecting 
those rights to a heckler’s veto. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court 
ordered the desegregation of Arkansas’ public schools 
notwithstanding the threat of upsetting those opposed to such 
desegregation.119 It did so against voter-sanctioned measures in 
Hunter v. Erickson120 and Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1.121 In both cases, the general population attempted to 
thwart movements towards civil rights and equity via 
constitutional amendment.122 Both times, the Court intervened 
and struck down those constitutional amendments. The Court 
                                                                                                     
 119. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (rejecting the 
contentions of the Arkansas Governor and Legislature that there is no 
duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on the Supreme 
Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution). 
 120. See generally Hunter v. Erickson, 89 S.Ct. 557 (1969) (explaining that 
an amendment of the city charter violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
allowing regulations based on race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry 
when approved by a majority).  
 121. See generally Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982) 
(deciding that an initiative prohibiting schools from requiring students to attend 
a school geographically nearest them, but allowing school boards to assign 
students away from their nearest school for reasons other than racial 
desegregation, violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 122. See id. at 3188 (attempting to terminate the use of mandatory busing 
for purposes of racial integration in the public schools of the State of 
Washington); Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, at 1403 (deciding that there was a duty for 
state officials to obey federal court orders resting on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically the decision in Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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would reverse course in Schuette and condone the very actions 
it forsake in Hunter and Washington.123 
IV. Towards an Understanding of the Power to Set House Rules 
It is important to summarize how the Supreme Court 
delivered to White Americans the power to set house rules 
and how that power has been protected, not only by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions but also by the Court’s decisions to 
hear cases. Starting with the Court’s decisions in Brown I and 
Brown II, the terms of desegregation attempts would be set by 
the public mood as displayed by White Americans.124 The terms 
put forth by White Americans included delaying the 
desegregation of the nation’s public schools until the Court 
would tolerate no more delays. When required to desegregate 
public schools, recalcitrant school districts avoided meaningful 
desegregation attempts by implementing halfhearted school 
choice plans designed to maintain racial segregation in the 
public schools as opposed to implementing plans that would 
undermine racial segregation in the public schools. The Court 
would strike down most of those choice plans as not effective 
at remedying the immediate and lingering effects of state-
sponsored segregation. Efforts at segregation would not, 
however, die quickly or easily. The Supreme Court would later 
accept the idea of a suburban veto and allow for White 
Americans who opposed the idea of desegregated public schools 
to opt out of the process of desegregating the nation’s public 
schools.  
                                                                                                     
 123. See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (“Democracy does 
not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public 
debate.”). 
 124. See Brown I, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954) (ruling that segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and 
other tangible factors may be equal, deprives the children of the minority group 
of equal educational opportunities, in contravention of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brown II, 75 S.Ct. 753 (1955) 
(explaining that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional 
and restored cases to docket for further argument regarding formulation of 
decrees). 
DIFFERENT SCRIPT, SAME CASTE 333 
In many ways, the development of a school choice agenda 
did more than just privilege White Americans. It also allowed 
White Americans to avoid accepting fault in the state-
sponsorship of segregation while also allowing them to change 
the conversations about desegregation (from desegregation to a 
parent’s control of their child’s upbringing) and, most 
importantly, the rules by which desegregation would occur. In 
a couple of decades, the Supreme Court’s rule that schools be 
desegregated without respect for opposition transformed—
through a challenge from White Americans—from 
desegregation at all costs to an exception that some White 
families may opt out of the desegregation of the nation’s public 
schools. 
In the K-12 setting, Whites not only had the state-
sanctioned power to set pace, but they also had the state-
sanctioned power to set the rules as well as change the rules 
midcourse. This power transferred to the higher education 
setting. First, White males challenged affirmative action 
programs benefiting racial minorities on the grounds that 
qualified White applicants were purportedly shunted in favor of 
unqualified racial minorities.125 Though this iteration of the 
facts of Bakke is generally accepted, a close read of the Court’s 
decision reveals that Allan Bakke was afforded the opportunity 
to choose which indicators would best support his 
admissibility.126 He chose standardized test scores, in which he 
easily outclassed his competitors. Neither Bakke nor the Court 
examines or gives credibility to the Medical School’s assessment 
of Bakke’s in-person interview as being lackluster.127 After 
Bakke, the rule was that presumptively qualified White 
applicants could challenge minority admittees as presumptively 
                                                                                                     
 125. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266 (1978) 
(describing plaintiff’s argument that he was excluded from admission in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because applicants with lower scores 
than him were admitted). 
 126. See id. at 277 (focusing on the grade point averages, MCAT scores, and 
“benchmark scores” of the applicant). 
 127. See id. (noting that Dr. Lowrey, Bakke’s faculty interviewer, gave him 
the lowest of his six ratings after the interview). 
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unqualified based on unreliable, but supposedly objective, 
standardized test scores.128 
White Americans would later change that rule in the 
Michigan affirmative action cases. Unlike Allan Bakke, the 
plaintiffs in the Michigan cases never put forth an argument 
that minority students were under or unqualified.129 To the 
contrary, the qualifications of the applicants who were racial 
minorities was nearly stipulated; nevertheless, the Court 
would hear the complaint of White applicants who were upset 
that equally qualified applicants who were racial minorities 
were accepted for admission into the competitive state 
school.130 The rule was no longer that presumptively qualified 
White applicants could challenge the admission of 
presumptively unqualified admittees who were racial 
minorities.131 Now, starting in 2003, White applicants who were 
presumptively qualified could also challenge the admission of 
presumptively qualified admittees who were racial minorities.132 
More poignantly, the unspoken and unwritten new rule after the 
Michigan affirmative action cases was that White applicants 
had to maintain an advantage over applicants who are racial 
minorities, even if all applicants in question were equally 
qualified. 
                                                                                                     
 128. See id. at 377 (stating that race is positively correlated with difference 
in GPA and MCAT scores, but economic disadvantage is not, which is how Davis 
chose 16 of the 100 positions in the class—spots were reserved for 
“disadvantaged” minority students). 
 129. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (arguing instead 
that the University of Michigan Law School admissions policy encouraging 
student body diversity violated their equal protection rights); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (alleging that the University of Michigan’s College of 
Literature, Science, and the Arts’ use of racial preferences in undergraduate 
admission violated the Equal Protection Clause).  
 130. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S.; see also Gratz, 539 U.S.. 
 131. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978) 
(arguing against refusal of admittance because “disadvantaged” minority 
students were admitted with lower test scores). 
 132. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (describing the law school’s goal as seeking 
to “assemble a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and 
broadly diverse,” and seeking to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.’”); 
see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 (noting that the University had considered 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be “underrepresented 
minorities,” and stating that it was undisputed that the University admitted 
virtually every qualified applicant from these groups).  
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Just about a decade later, White Americans would change 
the rule yet again. In the affirmative action case out of Texas, 
the Court would fail to dismiss the suit of an under- or 
unqualified White applicant who would challenge the admission 
of more qualified applicants who were racial minorities.133 
Despite the fact that the White applicant could not have 
been admitted, even if she were a racial minority, the Court 
would entertain her lawsuit.134 Most interestingly, the plaintiff 
in the Texas case—just as in almost all other affirmative action 
cases—only challenges the admission of the more qualified 
racial minority applicants.135 She never challenges the 
admission of White applicants who comprised the largest and 
disproportionate share of students admitted.136 The Court’s 
hearing of Abigail Fisher’s complaint was another shift in the 
rules. Not only could presumptively qualified White applicants 
challenge the admission of presumptively unqualified applicants 
who were racial minorities,137 presumptively qualified White 
applicants could also challenge admittedly qualified applicants 
who were racial minorities. 138 Fisher establishes yet a new rule 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013) 
(holding that the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the demanding 
burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Bakke, so remanded back to 
the district court).  
 134. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(describing how Fisher was denied after the University accepted students from 
the top ten percent of their class automatically and then utilized a Personal 
Achievement Index to be used with an Academic Index, based on high school 
rank, standardized test scores, and curriculum, to merit applicants not 
adequately reflected by their academic scores). 
 135. See id. at 240 (alleging that the University’s consideration of race in 
admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause even though UT’s College of 
Social Work had a quarter Hispanic and more than 10% African-American 
students, the College of Education had 22.4% Hispanic and 10.1% African 
American students and the College of Business Administration had only 14.5% 
Hispanic and 3.4% African-American students).  
 136. See generally id.; see generally Fisher II, 133 S.Ct. 2411. 
 137. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 2736 
(1978) (arguing that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated 
to exclude Bakke from the school on the basis of his race, especially because 
special applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores than Bakke’s in 
both years of application).  
 138. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003) (noting how the LSA 
considered petitioners Gratz and Hamacher to be within the qualified range but 
both were denied, claiming that the University’s use of racial preferences for 
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for challenging affirmative action in federal cases, admittedly 
under- or unqualified White applicants can challenge the 
admission of admitted qualified applicants who are racial 
minorities. Of course, the corollary to this rule is that it is now 
allowable, although it has not always been, to place the civil 
rights of minorities to popular vote when the Supreme Court 
chooses not to set aside the civil rights of racial minorities. 
To be able to set the rules of a game is powerful. To be able 
to change the rules of the game—midstride—might be 
insurmountable. In many race-related cases in education, 
White Americans have set the initial rules for access, but 
they have also held a Supreme Court-endorsed power to alter 
those rules as racial minorities rise to overcome the barriers 
imposed by the initial rules. Even the most qualified racial 
minority is subject to the approval of the least qualified White 
Americans under the rule in Fisher, but such approval will 
only be granted after racial minorities prove beyond a shadow 
of a doubt their qualifications. Even that is not assured, 
however. Such is the educational life of a racial minority in the 
United States. 
V. The Impacts of the House Rules Privilege on Racial 
Minorities: Placing the House Rules Privilege in the Context of 
Critical Race Theory 
Because White Americans have access to and do use the 
House Rules Power, efforts at equity— as opposed to 
equality— have done little to deliver racial minorities to a 
better place and space than during or before Jim Crow. There 
might be a different group of racial minorities with facially 
different lots in life, yet the result is the same, if not worse, for 
racial minorities. Once again, the script (roles) have changed, 
but the cast(e) is the same. This argument makes sense when 
evaluated within the philosophy of Critical Race Theory. 
                                                                                                     
“underrepresented minorities” in undergraduate admissions violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003) 
(stating that petitioner maintained a 3.6 GPA and 161 LSAT score and claimed 
that she was rejected because the Law School used race as a “predominant” 
factor). 
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Ladson-Billings and Tate IV best describe Critical Race Theory 
as a documentation of how traditional civil rights law has and 
is regularly co-opted to benefit White Americans.139 Ladson-
Billings and Tate IV reassert the traditional doubt of Critical 
Race Theorists: that incrementalism in the context of civil 
rights may be and often is insufficient to obtain adequate and 
appropriate remedies towards equity for racial and ethnic 
minorities.140 Although Critical Race Theorists do not all 
subscribe to one set of imperative and concrete tenets (and could 
not while also supporting the theory of individual narrative), 
there are some predominately agreed upon tenets of the Critical 
Race Theory Movement. These tenets focus on the endemic and 
continuing nature of race and oppression in our post-modern 
and post-racial society, the intersection of power and politics 
in shaping institutional disadvantage towards racial and ethnic 
minorities, a critique of the liberal agenda and the restrictive 
nature of interest convergence on effective civil rights 
remedies, and the need for counternarratives to challenge 
concepts of race and racism. 
The exclusive application of Critical Race Theory in the 
context of education began with the work of Gloria Ladson-
Billings and William Tate IV.141 Though acknowledging the 
broader work of Critical Race Theory, the authors specifically 
discussed how specifics tenets of Critical Race Theory are 
applicable in education. In doing so, Ladson-Billings and Tate 
IV established several broad application points for Critical Race 
Theory in education: 1) that racism is part and parcel of life in 
the United States, 2) the need for the reconstruction of historical 
narratives and 3) confronting the concept of race neutrality, 
colorblindness and meritocracy.142 Given the slant of the article 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Gloria Ladson-Billings &  William F. Tate IV, Toward a 
Critical Race Theory of Education, in 97(1) TEACHER S COLLEGE RECORD 
47, 62 (1995) (describing critical race theory). 
 140. See id. (suggesting that inequalities are a logical and predictable 
result of a racialized society in which discussions of race and racism 
continue to be muted and marginalized).  
 141. See id. at 47 (“This article argues for a critical race theoretical 
perspective in education analogous to that of critical race theory in legal 
scholarship. . . .”). 
 142. See generally id. 
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written by Ladson-Billings and Tate IV, one could more 
appropriately position their seminal work on Critical Race 
Theory in Education as having a predominately primary and 
secondary education focus.143 
Other scholars have considered how Critical Race Theory 
might be applicable in the context of higher education. Payne 
Hiraldo applies the tenets of Critical Race Theory to the 
context of higher education but focuses predominately on issues 
occurring while students are enrolled; little attention, however, 
is paid to the process for obtaining and assuring equitable 
inputs.144 Likewise, Shaun Harper has discussed how Black 
male students are “niggered” on the campuses of 
Predominately White Institutions.145 Harper, Patton and 
Wooden apply Critical Race Theory to other aspects of higher 
education.146 Among those covered in the paper are higher 
education funding laws and policies, HBCU desegregation, and 
affirmative action programs.147 Though the paper by Harper 
and colleagues discusses the role—albeit dwindling—of the 
interest convergence theory,148 something seems too  amiss 
                                                                                                     
 143. See generally id. (discussing the education of children as well as 
high school-aged children). 
 144. See Payne Hiraldo, The Role of Critical Race Theory in Higher 
Education, 31 THE VT. CONNECTION 53, 53 (2010) (analyzing critical race 
theory in the context of diversity and inclusion in higher education).  
 145. See Shaun R. Harper, Niggers no more: A Critical Race 
Counternarrative on Black Male Student Achievement at Predominately 
White Colleges and Universities, 22(6) INT’L J. OF QUALITATIVE STUD. IN 
EDUC. 697, 697–712 (2009) (describing how 143 interviews across the United 
States with black male undergraduates demonstrated that black men are 
resistant to racist stereotyping).  
 146. See Shaun R. Harper, Lori D. Patton & Ontario S. Wooden, Access 
and Equity for African-American Students in Higher Education: A 
Critical Race Historical Analysis of Policy Efforts, 80(4) THE J. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. 389, 389–414 (2009) (using critical race theory to understand how 
white racist ideology has developed, and exploring reasons why African-
American men have lower rates of enrollment and degree attainment in 
higher education).  
 147. See id. at 398–400 (discussing African-American enrollment 
declines, funding inequities, forced HBCU desegregation, affirmative action 
and race-based policies at Predominately White Universities (PWI)).  
 148. See id. at 409 (explaining how the interest-convergence principle is 
manifested in that white people will support efforts for African Americans 
when their own interests are not threatened, or when they too stand to gain 
benefits).  
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when arguing that interest convergence can explain away the 
attacks on affirmative action. 
A. Do White People Get to Play By “House Rules”? 
Recall the story of Thanksgiving Day at my close friend’s 
home. My fraternity brother and I stood no chance at all to 
win that game of Spades. We never knew that the only way for 
the game of spades to be played was for the other team to win. 
The rules to the game continued to change, and each time that 
my fraternity brother and I would overcome a rule change, 
another rule would change and create yet another obstacle to 
be overcome by our team. The excuse for each rule change 
was always the same, “This is how we play in our house.” The 
rule changes only occurred when our opponents could not defeat 
our team using the then-existent rules. Furthermore, if the rule 
changes were always actual rules, those rules appeared 
purposefully unclear to our team at the beginning of the game; 
thus, we were wholly unable to take advantage of rules that 
might have been advantageous to our team in earlier rounds of 
the game. Despite our best efforts at perfection, there came a 
point where the other team finally came out on top. 
Immediately, the game ended. To this day, my fraternity 
brother and I joke about the imposition of “house rules.” 
Before moving forward with this analysis, it is important 
to provide a succinct definition of the phrase “house rules.” 
House rules are not a s tat ic  set of rules at all; instead, house 
rules come with the power to set, impose and alter rules as to 
provide a sought after and predetermined result. At first blush, 
it is difficult to determine how to position house rules in light 
of Critical Race Theory. This difficulty arises because house 
rules is not an explicit tenet of Critical Race Theory but rather 
explains how the compilations, the intersections, the 
interchangeability, the robust nature of racism in and of its 
facets operate to cripple the ability of traditionally 
marginalized and disenfranchised groups to overcome the ever-
amorphous and ever-arising barriers set before them in 
American society. In fact, when these groups do find ways to 
overcome, they may find that new barriers are constructed. 
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These new barriers often arise without notice and are not 
foreseeable by disadvantaged and marginalized populations. 
House rules played out in the creation of the school 
choice/suburban veto movement at the primary and secondary 
education level. Perhaps because of Ladson-Billings and Tate 
IV’s work, Critical Race Theory has been most used and 
therefore most useful for analyzing power, politics and policy 
at the K-12 level as opposed to in higher education scholarship 
where scholars have particularly addressed affirmative action 
policies and other policies in higher education in light of 
Critical Race Theory;149 the house rules power is a little more 
difficult to situate solely in the primary and secondary level of 
education. The most evident use of the House Rules Power in 
primary and secondary education was the creation of a rule to 
disconnect the past racist actions of Whites who had newly 
moved to the suburbs to avoid desegregation in Milliken.150 
Though it had not been historically the case, the holding in 
Milliken would thereafter allow for parents seeking to escape 
the requirements to desegregate the ability to opt out by 
merely moving across what is the equivalent of an arbitrary, 
if not often imaginary, geographic boundary.151 
                                                                                                     
 149. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 
(1993) (explaining that the concept of whiteness as a protectable property 
interest is the epicenter of affirmative action); Kwame Agyemang & Joshua 
DeLorme, Examining the Dearth of Black Head Coaches at the NCAA 
Football Bowl Subdivision Level: A Critical Race Theory and Social 
Dominance Theory Analysis, 3 J. OF ISSUES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
35–52 (2010) (using critical race theory in examining why there are so few 
Black head coaches at the College Level); Harper, Patton & Wooden, supra 
note 146, at 390 (analyzing how racist ideas have shaped policies in higher 
education using critical race theory as a lens); see also Harper, supra  note  
145,  at  697 (using a critical race theory approach to discuss the student 
achievement of Black male college students at predominantly white colleges 
and universities); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of 
Minorities in the Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist’s Perspective, 
95(4) MICH. L. REV. 1005 (1997) (discussing how to use critical race theory 
ideas to fix the issue of underrepresentation of Blacks in the legal 
profession). 
 150. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 718 (1974) (holding that it was improper to 
impose a multidistrict metropolitan remedy for single-district de jure 
segregation in this case).  
 151. See id. at 725 (explaining how the Detroit Board of Education created 
and maintained optional attendance zones which had the “natural, probable, 
foreseeable, and actual effect” of allowing white pupils to escape identifiably 
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House rules are not limited to use in primary and 
secondary schools although they might have arisen from the 
Court’s reasoning(s) in those cases. House rules have always 
been utilized in the context of affirmative action in higher 
education. Allan Bakke used house rules to determine what 
portions of his application would be granted the greatest—and 
dispositive—weight.152 The Court added to Bakke’s use of 
House Rules by defining diversity in a way that would allow 
White applicants to be advantaged, even in application pools 
meant to open doors for racial and ethnic minorities.153 It was 
clear that Whites could choose whichever portion of their 
application was most advantageous to contrast against minority 
student applications in an effort to prove that White applicants 
were objectively meritorious as compared to racial minorities. 
This rule was relatively effective since racial minorities lagged 
Whites on standardized test scores for decades.154 As minority 
students performed better on standardized tests, a new rule 
was needed. The Court would move from allowing White 
applicants professing to be more qualified than racial minority 
applicants to challenge admissions decisions to allowing White 
applicants who held no purported competitive edge against 
racial minority applicants to challenge admissions decisions. 
Instead of dismissing the plaintiffs’ cases in Michigan as a case 
where a school—with a limited allotment of seats—chose one 
qualified candidate over another, the Court would sanction an 
investigation into the qualification of admittedly qualified 
applicants who were racial minorities. Even that rule needed 
some tweaking, however. The Court would then allow 
admittedly under- or unqualified White applicants to challenge 
the admission of admittedly qualified applicants who were 
racial minorities. Finally, the Court—unable to reach a 
                                                                                                     
Negro schools).  
 152. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 153. See id. at 267 (holding that race may be one of a number of factors 
considered by school in passing on applications).  
 154. See The Widening Racial Scoring Gap in Standardized Tests for 
Admissions to Graduate School, THE J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. (2006), 
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/51_graduate_admissions_test.html (finding 
that Black students have historically and continue to lag behind their White 
counterparts on standardized tests). 
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consensus on either granting or excluding racial minority 
applicants equitable methods into higher education—decided 
to allow one more rule change. Now, the Court would allow 
the civil rights of minorities to be put to public referendum. 
Though the plaintiffs in most anti-affirmative action cases 
declare motives based on race-neutrality and meritocracy, it is 
inescapable and unnerving that White applicants only 
challenge the admission of racial minorities in some 
circumstances. This is particularly relevant at the 
undergraduate level. In the cases of the University of 
Michigan and University of Texas, White undergraduate 
students challenged the admission of either equally or more 
qualified racial minority applicants.155 
Both federal court decisions are void of any analysis of the 
impact of affirmative action admissions of Black athletes. Where 
it is proven that student-athletes are routinely admitted with 
lower test scores than their nonathletic counterparts,156 one 
would expect—at least—some challenge to the admission of 
applicants who are presumptively less academically 
meritorious than the applicant-plaintiffs for admission into the 
University of Michigan or the University of Texas under the 
plaintiffs’ own analyses. Critical Race Theory provides a lens for 
analyzing the lack of challenges to the disproportionate 
admission of Black athletes: the interests of the rejected 
White applicants are in some way aligned with the interest of 
Black athletes. The enrollment of Black athletes, who are 
assumed to be more athletic and less intelligent,157 promotes 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the plaintiffs did not argue that the minority plaintiffs 
at issue failed to meet the prescribed criteria); see also, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing that no student with 
Fisher’s scores were admitted into Fisher’s preferred academic programs).  
 156. See Jamel K. Donnor, Towards an Interest-Convergence in the 
Education of African-American Football Student Athletes in Major College 
Sports, 8(1) RACE, ETHNICITY AND EDUC. 45, 49 (2005) (explaining that this 
is particularly the case at the University of Michigan Ann Arbor—the site 
of the Gratz case—where the typical athlete admitted to the university on 
average scores an astonishing 364 points less on the SAT than their non-
athlete counterparts). 
 157. See Harry Edwards, The Black ‘Dumb Jock’: An American Sports 
Tragedy, 131 THE C. BOARD REV. 8, 8–13 (1984) (explaining how false 
expectations for Black athletes to be dumb encourages their social 
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institutional advancement,158 and institutional advancement 
benefits White students.159 This argument is in sync with 
Derrick Bell’s foundational Critical Race Theory tenet, interest 
convergence theory.160 The racial circumstances of high paid 
coaches and essentially free-wage athletes in NCAA Division I 
is eerily similar to slavery with White people dominating the 
high paid positions and Blacks dominating the money-
producing, low-paid positions.161 With this knowledge, it is not 
surprising that White would-be-applicants fail to consider the 
impact of Black male athletes on reducing the number of 
available spots for White students’ admission. 
The case of Black athletes is also explainable by the 
theory advanced previously in this Article: diversity should be 
pursued in higher education so long as White applicants may 
also benefit without suffering undue loss of power and 
privilege. Black athletes contribute to diversity while not taking 
the place of White students. In many ways, Black athletes often 
place themselves in harm’s way for the sake of advancing the 
institution while assuring that White students’ place(s) at the 
institution will not be put in harm’s way.  
The institution and White students benefit in multiple 
ways from the presence of Black athletes. The existence and 
attention of a competitive sports program has financial and 
reputational rewards.162 What is more important is the fact 
that Black athletes have lower graduation rates from post-
secondary schools163 and often do not provide competition in the 
                                                                                                     
exploitation). 
 158. See Donnor, supra note 156, at 49 (“Consequently, the institutional 
pressure to compete annually for prestige and revenue not only defines a 
student athlete’s existence on campus; it explicitly tells him where to 
concentrate his energies for the next four or five years.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 57–63 (stating that Bell believed that judicial relief for 
racism only occurs when it directly or indirectly furthers the best interest of 
the nation rather than the group that suffered the injustice). 
 161. See generally Agyemang & DeLorme, supra note 149.  
 162. See Donnor, supra note 156, at 49 (“[T]he more successful a football 
program is, the more that institution is able to enhance its image and 
market itself as a first-rate university.”).  
 163. Id. at 46.  
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job markets dominated by White degree holders.164 Black 
athletes, therefore, serve to entertain White students during 
their college years and get to be easily dismissed after their 
usefulness to the institution and White people has expired. 
Supporting this thesis is the fact that Black athletes account 
for over half of all Division I athletes, yet Black athletes 
struggle to get the most profitable jobs in college athletics after 
graduation, positions for which they might be most qualified 
to hold.165 In other words, the pursuit of diversity is an 
excellent endeavor when 1) there is a perceived benefit that does 
not undo the privilege and power of being White (before, 
during, and/or after collegiate studies) and 2) a White person is 
able to monitor the Black players—keeping them in check—
while making large sums of money from what is routinely 
considered amateur sports. This may not seem to be a changing 
of the rules, and in fact, it is not. There is no need to change 
the rules for most athletes since large numbers of Black 
athletes will return to their rightful, subjugated place in 
society after completing their respective tasks. That is, of 
course, unless White people allow otherwise. 
B. Amendment Rather Than A Replacement: Passive and Active 
Racism in the Context of the Foundation of Critical Race Theory 
The early foundations of Critical Race Theory implied but 
did not explicitly state the amorphous nature of racism and 
when those foundational texts did address the amorphous 
nature of racism, they did so in language concerning the 
institutional impositions of racism. This language has been 
more recently co-opted to provide an intervening and 
preventive step in addressing the individual culprits of racism. 
From its beginning, Critical Race Theory has challenged the 
Court’s efforts at addressing racism as ineffective due primarily 
to the Court’s fascination with addressing only some explicitly 
stated forms of racism. Critical Race Theorists have responded 
to the Court’s ineffectiveness in remedying racial inequity, 
                                                                                                     
 164. See id. at 50 (arguing that Black male athletes in major sports are 
enrolled in less rigorous courses than their peers).  
 165. See generally Agyemang & Joshua DeLorme, supra note 149. 
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inequality, and oppression through substantial debate around 
the ideas of interest convergence, perspectives on remedying 
racism, unconscious racism, and Whiteness as property. This 
subsection places the idea of a House Rules Power in the 
context of the early foundations of Critical Race Theory. 
One must fully understand the requisite circumstances to 
utilizing the House Rules Power. To use the House Rules 
Power, White Americans must be able to participate in both 
passive and active racism.166 Passive racism is the scenario in 
which White Americans may and often do intentionally opt 
into the systemic structures that enable and perpetuate the 
oppression of racial minorities.167 Passive racism has the 
appearance of a systemic problem because intent is hard to 
identify; moreover, passive racism does not involve a clearly 
discernible individual motive against racial minorities and 
towards racial oppression.168 White flight is passive racism. 
Through White flight, White Americans are opting into a 
structure that has the result and is fully intended to place 
racial and ethnic minorities in a particular subjugated caste. 
Some may argue that White flight is systemic racism; in other 
words, while some White Americans are opting into White 
flight, the structure of White flight is racist but the individual 
White flighters are not racist.169 It goes without saying, 
however, that White Americans must make individual and 
intent-driven choices to perpetuate White flight. The school-to-
prison pipeline is another form of passive racism. Through the 
school-to-prison pipeline, the educational system is opting to 
place and contain Black and Brown students in particularly 
low castes, or in prison. Some have argued that the school-
to-prison pipeline is a version of systemic racism, but what is 
most true about the school-to-prison pipeline is that educators 
must make individual choices to remove Black and Brown 
                                                                                                     
 166. See generally BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS 
SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 11 
(1997) (conceptualizing the difference between active and passive racism). 
 167. See id. (explaining how passive racism is more subtle than active 
racism).  
 168. See generally id. 
 169. See id. (stating that not all White people are bad people, but that White 
people, intentionally or unintentionally, do benefit from racism).  
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students from inclusive educational settings, and in making 
these choices, these individual educators are empowering the 
racist system. Despite efforts purporting to create interventions 
to stem the school-to-prison pipeline, there need not be any 
intervention to stop the school-to-prison pipeline. If society 
desires to stop removing Black and Brown students from 
schools, policymakers and policy implementers could choose to 
1) not create policy that is aimed to specifically address 
students who are racial and/or ethnic minorities and/or 
2) simply not remove Black and Brown students from school.  
The other side of the requisites for the use of House 
Rules is active racism.170 Active racism is the scenario in 
which White Americans may and often do opt to use systems 
that specifically target racial and ethnic minorities for 
identifiable oppression and exclusion.171 Active racism has a 
clear—though often overlooked—racial motive. Challenges to 
affirmative action policies are active racism. Through 
challenges to affirmative action policies, White Americans have 
only sought to exclude racial and ethnic minorities. For instance, 
in the Michigan and Texas cases only the admission of racial 
minorities was challenged despite the fact that 1) the 
Michigan plaintiffs never alleged that the admitted racial 
minorities were under- or unqualified172 and 2) the federal 
courts acknowledged that every admitted racial minority in the 
Texas case was more qualified than the plaintiff.173 To fully 
effectuate the use of house rules, White Americans must be 
able to opt into systemically racist structures; thus, passive 
racism is the preferred type of racism. This option mutes the 
need for consistent and persistent explicit individual 
oppression; thereby, White Americans do not have to face the 
ghastly charge of individual and overt racism on a daily 
basis. Occasionally, passive racism is ineffective at effectuating 
the magnitude of necessary oppression against racial and 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. (describing “active racism” as “blatant, intentional acts of racial 
bigotry and discrimination.”). 
 171. Id.  
 172. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 173. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 
2014).  
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ethnic minorities. In this case, passive racism becomes active 
and overt attacks against minorities occur to quash further 
efforts at equity. Passive and active racism are not mutually 
exclusive; instead, the two are necessary components of each 
other. Active racism is necessary to create systems that 
passively racist White Americans can later opt into without 
expressed intent to discriminate (and the concomitant reproach 
from a post-racial society). 
Evidence of the House Rules Power and its prerequisites 
(passive and active racism) exist from the foundation of Critical 
Race Theory. Many Critical Race Theory scholars have 
intimated, if not explicitly stated, the changing nature of race 
and racism in American society. For instance, Professor Derrick 
Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence asserts that the remedies 
of the Civil Rights Movement exist in large measures with the 
conjoined values of the White and Black populations.174 Not 
only do the remedies of the Civil Rights Movement serve to 
support Bell’s theory, so do the plaintiffs’ and the federal 
courts’ actions in affirmative action cases. The fact that White 
plaintiffs in affirmative action cases have not challenged the 
admission of Black and Brown athletes into selective state 
universities is explainable in that the interest of those Black and 
Brown students converge with the interests of White dominant 
society.175 Professor Bell’s theory does not, however, answer all 
questions pertaining to the argument against even equally or 
more qualified Black and Brown students (as compared to 
White applicants) seeking admission into state universities, for 
even White dominant society considers these students as 
objectively better prepared for post-secondary studies. Here, 
the contrast between passive and active racism is useful. It is 
possible and likely that White Americans may have experienced 
interest convergence during the initial phases of desegregation 
and affirmative action.176 It is also possible, and Bell has argued, 
                                                                                                     
 174. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (suggesting that it is 
better to focus on quality education for Blacks rather than ensuring racial 
balance at schools). 
 175. Donnor, supra note 156, at 45–67. 
 176. See Bell, supra note 174, at 525 (stating that Whites realized that 
segregation was a barrier to further industrialization of the South). 
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that this interest convergence might have been begrudged.177 
If, in fact, Whites experienced reluctant interest convergence, 
then there may never have been a true disdain for racism among 
White dominant society writ large. White Americans may have 
been willing to deal with affirmative action so long as they lost 
nothing—or very little—in the movement towards racial equity.  
Starting with Bakke, White Americans could be passively 
racist and opt to challenge the qualifications of racial 
minorities on test scores alone since admissions test scores 
were often skewed in favor of White applicants and against 
racial minorities.178 These challenges appeared ostensibly 
nonracist since the objectives were lodged on “objective” 
measures of merit. The ability to opt into passive racism 
appeared to be in jeopardy in Gratz and Fisher; standardized 
tests were no longer as effective a barrier against minority 
applicants. White Americans needed active racism, and active 
racism came in the form of changing the rules to allow 
challenges to the admission of even objectively qualified racial 
minorities. Thus, passive and active racism fit well within 
Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence. When interests 
converge, racism is typically passive. When interests diverge, 
racism becomes active to recast(e) systems to allow for further 
and enhanced passive racism. 
The concepts of passive and active racism may be properly 
situated in the foundations of Critical Race Theory outside of 
Professor Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence. Passive and 
active racism fit within Alan David Freeman’s analysis of civil 
rights case law from the perspective of perpetrators versus 
victims’ perspectives. Freeman’s argues that the Court’s 
analysis of civil rights challenges has occurred in the context of 
the perpetrator’s perspective as opposed to the victim’s 
perspective.179 Freeman argues that evaluation of civil rights 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. at 523–28 (citing the outside factors requiring interest 
convergence). 
 178. See generally Maria Veronica Santelices & Mark Wilson, Unfair 
Treatment: The Case of Freedle, the SAT, and the Standardization 
Approach to Differential Item Functioning, 80 HARV. EDUC. REV. 106 (2010) 
(explaining how the SAT is proven to function differently for Blacks and other 
White subgroups, and how this phenomenon should be further researched). 
 179. See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
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cases through the lens of a victim’s perspective would give a 
more robust and effective remedy for racial and ethnic 
minorities because such a perspective would provide more 
flexibility to deal with the social and historical circumstances 
as opposed to individual yet shapeshifting actions that are 
associated with racism and oppression.180 
Freeman’s argument appears to set the stage for the 
development of ideas and ideals of systemic racism.181 He even 
predicts the Court’s discussion of a needed critical mass in his 
discussion about the “tipping point”182 and, most importantly, 
addresses the issue of intentional racism.183 To add another 
facet to Freeman’s theory, the active and passive theory of 
racism challenges not the existence and/or intentionality of 
individual racist acts but asserts that even “unintentional” or 
systemic racism is intentional racism. As previously stated, to 
consciously opt into systemic racism is an actual and 
intentional act in and of itself. Thus, to exculpate individual 
actions under a theory of the institutionalism of racism is 
patently wrong. Allowing for the option and existence of 
institutional or systemic racism has accomplished numerous 
objectives for those choosing racism (whether passive or 
active). Perpetrators of racism have been able to use a stealth 
and robust form of passive racism to perpetuate extant forms 
of overt racism. Perhaps a soothsayer of sorts, Freeman’s 
allegation that a victim’s perspective in civil rights cases 
would result in a more useful and manipulative approach to 
advancing meaningful civil rights remedies has come true in the 
converse: a perpetrator’s perspective has allowed a more 
useful and manipulative approach to preventing meaningful 
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civil rights remedies. Likewise, denial of the impact of racism 
is a purposeful rejection of others’ realities. 
Further connections between passive and active racism 
exist between the foundations of Critical Race Theory when 
accounting for Charles R. Lawrence III’s assessment of 
unconscious racism. Lawrence III asserts that “the injury of 
racial inequality exists irrespective of the decision makers’ 
motives.”184 Lawrence proffers an argument using slips of tongues 
to address unconscious racism.185 He later attests that slips of 
tongues are products of larger societal issues paving the way 
for greater oppression of racial minorities.186 Lawrence 
concludes his essay by noting that the Supreme Court and the 
academic establishment may be slow to adopt approaches that 
address unconscious racism.187 It is necessary to further develop 
or contest Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism to place the 
concepts of passive and active racism into a concept of 
unconscious racism unless the term unconscious racism is a 
misnomer. I submit that Lawrence does not speak of 
unconscious racism because he specifically discusses the 
reliance of unconscious racism on the acceptance of cultural 
stereotypes.188 I propose that to accept a cultural stereotype 
and to not explicitly reject one are offenses with similar results, 
processes, and intentions. The similar result is the further 
perpetuation of the stereotype. The similar intent is to leave 
intact the options for passive racism. The similar process is 
choice. In other words, to accept the concept that Black men 
are violent, uneducated, or whatever other unsavory stereotype 
may exist has the same intent of not challenging those very 
same stereotypes. The non-challenger and acceptor may easily 
dismiss any individual or overt racism while blaming the extant 
oppression of the group stereotyped on societal oppression 
rather than the individual and overt decision to not opt out of 
the very privilege allowing the non-challenger and/or acceptor to 
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experience some tangible benefit. Given this scenario, it is 
possible and probable that all “unconscious” racism is to some 
extent intentional and conscious though it is comfortable to 
think otherwise. In many ways, people may be merely picking 
when to assert their power, privilege, and prejudice under the 
cover of accidental or more appropriately incidental racism; they 
may also be picking to preserve the option to slyly opt into 
what can then be proclaimed to be mere accidental racism (or 
racism by mistake).189 
In the interest of clarification, the importance of intent (or 
lack thereof) must be addressed at this point. The very 
structure of society’s parsing of intent is based on the notion 
that one’s actions become less vile if the actor’s actions can be 
proven to lack a certain degree of intentionality. This 
argument takes the perpetrator’s perspective. This perspective 
misplaces the power to design remedies in the hands of the 
perpetrator by restricting the victim’s wide range of potential 
grievances and emotions and allowing the perpetrator (or some 
other person or entity) to construct and assess the perpetrator’s 
culpability. In many ways, the legal system has acculturated 
society to assume the importance of intent. Sliding scales of 
intentionality and culpability might be appropriate for crimes, 
but their use in oppression is severely inappropriate. For 
instance, despite the fact that manslaughter and murder 
have the same consequence, the intent of one makes the 
perpetrator’s culpability greater than the other. Assessing the 
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perpetrator’s culpability under a sliding scale of intentionality 
assumes, however, that there are sliding scales of harm 
occurring as the result of racist acts. This is patently untrue in 
most, if not all, cases of oppression.  
There are not sliding scales of racism; racism, whether 
commissioned by lack of intention to the aggrieved party 
(assume here that the perpetrator by not recognizing the 
existence of the victim is stripping the victim of his or her 
humanity) or for reason of intentional harm, has the same 
impact for the victim. Sliding scales of intent and culpability 
do, however, allow White Americans and especially White 
liberals, to disassociate their bad acts with the bad acts of 
other, more racist White people. At its core, sliding scales of 
intentionality and culpability allow White Americans to be 
“not that racist,” maintaining the structures and benefits of 
oppressive systems while only making marginal, if any, 
progress towards equity. When the victim’s perspective is 
taken, the idea of intent becomes somewhat of a legal and 
practical fiction. The victim of a racist act will seldom care if 
the perpetrator of the act acts without “intention” for the 
pain will almost certainly be the same, except that the pain 
might be more if the victim viewed the perpetrator as an ally or 
someone who might otherwise not be expected to be racist. 
Intent, under the victim’s perspective, does not matter for only 
the perpetrator may feel good about his or her “unintentional” 
transgression. The perpetrator is allowed to mold a story 
where he or she becomes a protagonist (hero for being less 
racist than a Klansman) or a redemption-seeking antagonist 
(as racist as a Klansman but seeking improvement). The 
victim does not enjoy a similar privilege. 
Passive and active racism are finally linked to the 
foundations of Critical Race Theory as a parallel to Neil 
Gotanda’s theory of formal race as opposed to racial 
subordination. Gotanda propounds a Critical Race Theory 
framework that challenges the judicial system to cease and 
desist the ignoring of racial subordination in favor of the 
court’s preoccupation with a view of race that dismisses and is 
decoupled from the historical realities of racial oppression.190 
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Gotanda properly understands the mutable nature of racism 
and racial oppression in this avowal. Moreover, Gotanda 
advances a framework that assumes that “[s]ubordination occurs 
in the very act of a White person recognizing a Black person’s 
race.”191 It is important under the concept of passive and active 
racism to understand that subordination also occurs in the 
very act of a White person opting to be White and exercise 
Whiteness to their advantage.192 Cheryl I. Harris has also argued 
for an understanding that Whiteness and the status of being 
White has a court-protected property interest;193 understanding 
that Whites may subordinate other races by merely opting into 
Whiteness is near the core of passive racism. White Americans 
can be passively or actively racist by opting into Whiteness, 
particularly, those parts of Whiteness that represent systems 
and institutions of oppression and subordination. As previously 
argued in this section, Whites are also passively racist by 
choosing to opt out of challenging systems and institutions of 
oppression and subordination. In many ways, refusing to 
challenge racially oppressive structures or pretending that 
those structures do not exist is opting into Whiteness. Whites 
are actively racist by choosing to actively exclude and/or 
oppress racial and/or ethnic minorities.  
Though numerous other connections exist between the 
concepts of active and passive racism and the foundations of 
Critical Race Theory, time and space limit the ability to make 
such connections. Notwithstanding those limitations, it remains 
important to situate and ground active and passive 
representation within the Critical Race Theory frameworks. 
Moreover, it is paramount to assess both individual, overt 
racism and systemic (or institutional racism) in the context of 
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passive and active racism. This is particularly true of systemic 
racism, which may pardon the intentional and overt choices of 
White Americans to take advantage of systems and institutions 
constructed to maintain and/or expand systems of oppression. 
VI. Conclusion: Moving Forward 
In many ways, the foundations of Critical Race Theory 
explain the existence of the House Rules Power. Questions 
arise when considering the factors necessary for the effectuation 
of the House Rules Power and the effectuation of that power: Is 
systemic racism the same as overt racism? Do the two operate 
concurrently? Could it be that the idea of systemic/institutional 
racism could be used to obfuscate occurrences of overt racism? 
I suppose that institutional racism is at its essence another 
form of individual and overt racism. It is often regarded as 
ungracious to be overtly racist in contemporary society. 
Perhaps this societal expectation is misstated. Might it be 
more acceptable to be occasionally racist, much like one might 
be an occasional drinker or smoker? Does this same result hold 
for a social racist, or one that is racist in certain social 
environments? A more distant look at the Court’s decision in 
race-related education cases reveals that it is okay to be racist 
as long as one can blame the faux pas on systemic racism as 
opposed to individual, overt racism although the two are the 
same. 
While anti-racist minds continue to endeavor to uncover 
ways that systemic racism has displaced or become more 
prevalent than overt racism, it is necessary to start assessing 
the coexistence of the two. In many ways, the House Rules 
Power reveals the unique ability of racism to oscillate between 
systemic and overt, at the whim of White Americans. The 
Supreme Court’s case law reveals that the house changes the 
rules midgame when White Americans are no longer 
prohibitively favored for college admissions. Of course, one 
middle-class, hardworking White applicant must be sacrificed to 
change the rules, but those Whites who are sacrificed still win. 
They might just as well be called martyrs. When racism wavers 
between systemic and overt manifestations, White Americans 
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are, thus, protected from the dreaded label of being individual, 
overt racists. This occurs because systemic racism tends to 
absolve individual White Americans of the guilt of the many 
racist choices involved in embracing systemic racism. The 
argument is that the system is unfair, not the individual 
person. It is far easier to declare that the perpetuation of 
exclusionary, oppressive and racist practices are examples of 
systemic—or more appropriately in this case “accidental”—
racism rather than examples of individual or series of intentional 
acts of racism. In other words, the perpetrator of the racist act 
is not racist per se; he or she is simply unaware of the racist 
impact of their actions. 
There is, however, a more pernicious fact about treating 
systemic racism and overt racism as two independent 
phenomena; it creates the ability for racism (and racists) to 
hibernate or become dormant. The House Rules Power is only 
successful because it operates in an alternative space of 
passive and active racism. Under a theory of passive and 
active racism, even systemic racism is actually overt in that 
it specifically allows for Whites—who can disguise themselves 
as unbiased pursuers of racial justice and equality (as opposed 
to equity)—to become overtly racists when necessary and avoid 
blame by distorting the true intent of their actions: to disrupt 
the progress of racial equity for racial minorities or protect 
their own power positions. This happens when a system has 
been designed to stymie the progress of a racial minority 
group.  
This happened when the Court—in Bakke—allowed Allan 
Bakke to choose how he could be compared to minority 
candidates and simultaneously expanded diversity to include 
examples that would make White applicants eligible.194 By 
focusing on test scores, which have handicapped racial 
minorities, the Court assured that the system could continue to 
privilege membership in the White race as opposed to others. 
The Court would expand the process of identifying diversity to 
allow for schools to be diverse in many ways while avoiding 
racial diversity. The Court would establish a new rule when 
                                                                                                     
 194. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265–
320 (1978). 
356 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2016) 
too many racial minorities would overcome the barriers of 
standardized tests. Now even equally qualified racial 
minorities needed intensified vetting beyond the traditional 
application process and conducted by the highest court in 
the land, to assure they are acceptable as replacements for 
White applicants. The Court would focus on the role of 
systemic racism in preventing the admission of applicants who 
were racial minorities, but that focus is misplaced. Systemic 
racism is overt racism. The plaintiffs in both Michigan and 
Texas contested the admission of applicants who were racial 
minorities on race alone. In Michigan, the qualifications of the 
admitted racial minorities were not challenged. In Texas, the 
admitted racial minorities were better qualified than the 
rejected White applicant. Still, the challenge moved forward. 
Notably, under- or unqualified White applicants—though they 
existed in both Michigan and Texas—went unchallenged. 
There is nothing systemic about an individual White plaintiff 
challenging only racial minorities who were admitted into an 
elite university; this is individual and overt racism, yet the 
White plaintiffs in those cases are allowed to escape the 
identification and the scrutiny that accompanies such 
identification because their racism was perpetuating a racist 
system while those same racist plaintiffs are hailed as martyrs 
for the cause of racial oppression. 
